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This issues paper reviews existing empirical
analyses of agriculture’s relevance to rural
livelihoods and contrasts these with the
prevailing concepts and approaches that guide
the Afghan government and international
assistance community’s response to the
“crisis” in Afghan agriculture. Findings stress
that the visions of the aid community are not
congruent with the perceptions and goals of
local and national government. On the one
hand, most aid programming implies that
development efforts can start from a blank
slate due to the supposed collapse of
governance and livelihoods. On the other
hand, the visions of the government
encourage ignoring ongoing local processes
and international market trends, since the
visions of the past are assumed to still be
valid and viable. Neither encourages looking
at farmers’ own agricultural development
efforts.  Current agricultural rehabilitation
and development efforts are supply-driven,
and are poorly anchored in an understanding
of what rural people themselves are striving
to achieve as they rehabilitate and develop
their own livelihoods.
In order to understand the current and
potential future relationships between
agriculture and livelihoods, it is essential to
look at how well agricultural policies and
programming are anchored in realistic,
principled and pragmatic analyses of the
situation at large. It also is essential to
examine trends in both markets for
agricultural products and markets for on- and
off-farm labour. Central to this is the need
to place an understanding of agriculture’s
role within a perspective of where agriculture
is not the main component of livelihoods.
The main component of livelihoods of rural
people is very different in high and low
potential areas. In the former, challenges in
retaining and regaining markets are the prime
concerns. In the latter, most people combine
limited and erratic agricultural production
with other livelihood options. In both,
smallholder subsistence-oriented farming is
but one aspect of how rural people survive.
In addition to examining agricultural policies,
this paper focuses upon two cross-cutting
themes. The first is how agricultural
rehabilitation efforts have shaped the current
interface between aid interventions and
farmers’ own livelihood strategies. The second
theme is that of poppy production. Just as
aid expenditure has been primarily, and
perhaps unduly, directed at seed
programming, the priorities of the private
sector have very heavily focused on opium
production.
Recommendations*
The recommendations contained in this paper
are intended as a framework for more
pragmatic and principled approaches to
increasing the impact of agricultural
development efforts on Afghan livelihoods.
These suggestions acknowledge the power
that history and current social, political and
economic relations have in steering local
development processes and in preserving
national policy narratives. It is argued that
narratives must be confronted if development
planning is to proceed in a manner that is
cognisant of what can be done and what
should be done in the current circumstances.
Build consensus on the goals and the
meaning of a facilitating and regulating
state in agricultural development
Current policy formation efforts combine
(and conflate) the needs for establishing
efficiency with enhancing equity in order to
reverse the trends that have driven the
Executive Summary
*  More detailed recommendations can be found in the conclusion section of this paper.
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conflict over the past decades. International
experience has shown that efficiency and
equity can be combined, but are not self-
evident bedfellows. There is a need to move
toward more evidence-based policies that
combine principled commitments to efficiency
and equity with pragmatic acknowledgement
of trade-offs due to on-the-ground realities
and the essential but limited impact that aid
can make on social, political and economic
relations.
Reassess and reinforce the accountability
of the private sector and civil society in
agricultural development
In order to better define the role of the state,
notions and normative aims regarding the
private sector and civil society must be
anchored in an understanding of what these
sets of institutions really are. It is not enough
to label the private sector or civil society as
the solution. A frank assessment is needed
of what agricultural services they provide
and why they are providing (or failing to
provide) services to different groups of
farmers. Disaggregation between high and
low potential areas and between wealthy
and poor producers is a prerequisite to
predicting where different strategies can be
expected to succeed and who is likely to
benefit.
Put the market on the agenda
Apart from woes about the supposedly
unassailable profitability of opium production,
empirically grounded agro-economic and
market thinking has not gained centre stage
in policies and programming. Even those who
have recognised the importance of
diversification and market orientation have
run into difficulties in identifying where and
how to intervene. The challenges to gaining
an overview of market forces in a country
where such a large proportion of the market
is illicit are admittedly enormous, but the
dangers of continuing to leave these factors
on the back burner are greater. The market
is not a panacea for equitable rural
development, but recognition of its
importance would be an important step in
realigning programming with the prevailing
livelihood strategies of rural people and the
economic realities they face when trying to
sell their crops.
Deal with risk
In light of the legacy of conflict and natural
disasters, Afghans will inevitably make their
decisions about how to integrate agriculture
into their livelihoods primarily based on an
assessment of risk. Fears of renewed conflict
and natural hazards are at the core of
traders’, farmers’ and rural labourers’ choice
of livelihood options. The actions of the state
and the aid community already directly affect
the parameters for these risk assessments.
The relevance and effectiveness of agriculture
programming would therefore increase
enormously if risk was given far greater
prominence in policy formation. Instead of
being seen as a factor that scares donors,
risk awareness should be used to highlight
priorities for protecting rural livelihoods.
Issues Paper Series
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Points of departure
This issues paper explores how well in tune
Afghan agricultural policies and programmes
are to the ways that the people of rural
Afghanistan are themselves trying to survive
and rebuild their lives. It builds on the
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit’s
(AREU) earlier issues paper Addressing
Livelihoods in Afghanistan1 and also on the
ongoing livelihood monitoring studies of AREU
and other organisations. The emphasis of this
paper is not on describing agricultural
systems, but instead on reflecting on how
our admittedly limited knowledge of these
systems should better inform policy and
practice in (and beyond) the agricultural
sector. Livelihood analysis is applied in this
1.  Introduction and Methods
paper as a tool to assess the relevance of
current policies and programming with respect
to the ways in which people in rural areas
construct their livelihoods. A major goal of
livelihood analysis is to bring attention to
people’s vulnerabilities and the institutional
processes that frame their livelihood
strategies, including the impact of government
and the aid community’s programming and
policies for the poor.
The point of departure of this study is
agriculture and its links to livelihoods in a
broad sense, including how agricultural
production (or lack thereof) impacts on labour
markets, migration and local social, political
and economic relations. Agricultural
production is not analysed as if it were an
Ph
ot
o 
co
ur
te
sy
 o
f 
Ia
n 
Ch
ri
st
op
lo
s
1  Pain, A. and Lautze, S. Addressing Livelihoods in Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. September
2002.
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end in itself, but rather as one integrated
component in a wider set of livelihood options.
This broad perspective is applied in order to
understand both how agriculture affects
livelihoods and also how it does not. As one
observer writes of recent history, “Most rural
Afghans, and certainly poor rural Afghans,
did not meet their food needs primarily by
their own cultivation, but by a variety of
strategies, including the sale of livestock and
livestock products, casual labour, temporary
migration and remittances from relatives who
had permanently found refuge outside the
country.”2 This study aims to provide a basis
for better connecting an understanding of
Afghan agriculture with these wider survival
strategies. This paper highlights where
agriculture is proving to be but one component
within the more complex sets of strategies
that households are engaging in to survive,
to enhance their food security, and where
possible, to prosper. It is important to stress
that terms such as “livelihoods” and “food
security” are not always interpreted so widely
within governmental and non-governmental
agricultural bureaucracies.
This paper also critically analyses how
prevailing stories, or “narratives,” about
subsistence, technology transfer, the role of
the state and the nature of civil society
influence assumptions about how agriculture
and food production actually contribute to
livelihoods. It looks critically at the underlying
narratives in current agricultural programming
and also the motivations in aid and
governmental bureaucracies to buy into
simplified assumptions about farming. Special
attention is paid to how the rehabilitation
assistance community, together with the
Afghan bureaucracy, jump quickly into project
fixes that are poorly anchored in an
understanding of the solutions that farmers
themselves are exploring.
There are two cross-cutting themes
throughout this paper. The first is the ways
in which the architecture of agricultural
rehabilitation has shaped the current interface
between aid interventions and farmers’ own
livelihood strategies. This paper does not aim
to provide an in- depth analysis of agricultural
rehabilitation policy per se,3 but the prevailing
expenditure pattern in recent years has meant
that rehabilitation, and in particular the role
of seed programming, has had a profound
influence on almost all of the topics reviewed
in the paper. The gap between grander visions
for rural development and on-the-ground
programming realities is to a large extent
related to the narrow set of rehabilitation
interventions that actually receive funding.
The second cross-cutting theme is that of
poppy production. Just as aid expenditure
has been primarily, and perhaps unduly,
directed at seed programming, the priorities
of the private sector have very heavily focused
on opium production. There are a variety of
areas where dynamism can be found in private
sector-financed agricultural development,
but the overwhelming economic significance
of opium is undoubtedly the factor that most
strongly influences investment priorities, risk
assessments, local socio-political relations
and labour markets. There are a number of
research initiatives now underway to better
analyse this complex set of topics. It is hoped
that this paper may contribute to an
understanding of the broad contextual
framework in which these studies will need
to be embedded.
The paper is organised in the following way:
• The next chapter provides an overview
of the policy formation process in Afghan
agricultural development, and contrasts
the key narratives of the international
assistance community with the
2 Johnson, C. British Red Cross: Afghanistan Drought Response Case Study Notes for Seminar. 2003, 4.
3 This narrower topic will be addressed in a forthcoming study, by the same author, as part of an Overseas Development
Institute research project entitled “The changing roles of agricultural rehabilitation: linking relief, development and support
to rural livelihoods.”
Issues Paper Series
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)4
perceptions of local and national
government.
• Chapter three places this policy analysis
within the context of existing knowledge
about the relationship between
agriculture and livelihoods of rural
residents.
• Chapter four examines how programming
relates to livelihoods, particularly how
issues of risk, diversification and
transaction costs have been addressed.
• Chapter five contextualises the factors
for policy and programming by looking at
how technology transfer efforts and
service provision have/have not
broadened livelihood options.
• Finally, the paper concludes with
reflections on what a principled but
pragmatic approach to bringing these
factors together might entail. The
recommendations specifically address
how policy choices must proceed in the
face of uncertainty about the role of civil
society, distrust of the private sector and
disagreement over the role of the state.
Methods
This issues paper brings together the findings
of interviews with governmental staff, local
officials, NGO representatives, UN staff,
technical advisors and rural people. The
author collected data during two missions to
Afghanistan, September 2-20 and November
27-December 17, 2003, and visited Bamyan,
Kunduz and Takhar Provinces. The study did
not allow for extensive direct empirical
observation of rural conditions. The views
presented here represent a synthesis of the
findings of available research and NGO
studies, and are juxtaposed with the “policy
narratives” that clearly emerged in the
interviews that were conducted in the course
of the study. The methodology underlying
the study was to analyse how stories about
agriculture and rural development, which
steer the perceptions of the aid community,
relate to the actual struggles of rural people
to survive as described in available empirical
research.
A notable issue in assessing the validity of
the data cited in this paper is the question
of how much the phenomena described in
empirical studies represent recent adaptation
to conflict and drought, and how much they
are anchored in a history of recurrent crises
and recovery. For example, some studies
report a recent increase in indebtedness,
particularly the custom of desperate farmers
“pawning” (and subsequently losing control
of) their land. It is unclear whether this is a
new phenomenon resulting from drought,
changes in local power structures and
population pressures, or if it is a temporary
coping strategy that has appeared from time
to time in the past.
It should be stressed that there are major
gaps in available data on the link between
agriculture and livelihoods. Even before the
conflict of the past three decades, statistics
on rural populations, economies and social
conditions were extremely scarce.4 Despite
considerable investment in data collection
for project planning in recent years,
information remains extremely patchy and
the majority of studies available have had a
very limited geographical and topical focus.
Information on nutritional status, in particular,
is largely anecdotal or only valid for a limited
area. The link between agricultural production
and food consumption can therefore largely
only be speculated upon.5 Caution in
extrapolating general observations from
anecdotal studies is particularly important
since the effects of conflict, natural disaster
and even development over the past three
4 Pain, A. and Goodhand, J. Afghanistan: Current Employment and Socio-Economic Situation and Prospects. InFocus Programme
on Crisis Response and Reconstruction, Working Paper No. 8. Geneva: International Labour Organisation. 2002.
5 This shortage of data may soon change as the comprehensive National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment structure is put
into place.
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decades have been very diverse, episodic
and localised.6 With respect to the nature of
the state and societal structures, labels such
as “warlords,” “terrorists” and “chaos” have
been used to gloss over vast differences in
the quality, depth and justness of the forms
of governance that rural Afghans have endured
at the community level.
This study emphasises the narratives that
influence the production of data on Afghan
rural development. Some studies are cited
to highlight the prevailing pressures that have
created the stories that guide current
programming decisions. The source criticism
that appears in this paper is not intended as
cynical denigration, but is rather included
for illustrating why it has proven so difficult
to bridge that gap between programme
priorities and livelihood realities. The skewed
nature of incentives behind the production
of surveys and assessments in Afghanistan
influences what questions are asked in these
studies and how data are interpreted. When
trying to understand how rural people
themselves construct their livelihoods, aid
(rather than farmers’ own efforts) is usually
given undue attention, since most surveys
and assessments are intended as a basis for
planning increasing levels of aid disbursement.
One frustrated consultant writes that “all
reports read during the mission painted a
bleak picture of the country. The reports
focused on the negative, and identified an
aid-funded solution for every problem
mentioned.”7 These weaknesses in assessment
and p lann ing  have cont inued as
implementation has proceeded. Another study
acknowledged that the dearth of critical
reflection in agency reports had left it with
“little material on which to draw to contribute
theoretically or in terms of analytical method
to the debate on livelihoods under conditions
of political instability.”8 The situation today
is somewhat better, but still leaves much to
be desired.
6 Pain, A. Understanding and Monitoring Livelihoods Under Conditions of Chronic Conflict: Lessons from Afghanistan. Overseas
Development Institute (ODI) Working Paper No. 187. London: ODI. 2002.
7 Hockley Associates. Afghanistan: A Report Following Participation in the 2002 Crop and Food Supply Assessment on Behalf
of Chemonics, July 2002. Suffolk: Hockley Associates. 2002, 12.
8 Pain, 2002, op cit., 2.
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This chapter presents an overview of the
policy formation process in Afghan agricultural
development. Key narratives of the
international community regarding the “crisis”
in agriculture and public sector reform are
described. These international narratives are
contrasted with the perceptions of local and
national government. The question of how
Afghanistan’s agricultural production can be
integrated into regional and international
markets is also stressed. This section also
considers implications resulting from this mix
of narratives and perceptions, particularly
how the lack of consensus on programme
responses and priorities has led to a growing
gap between the policy debate and field-
level programming realities.
Beyond the tradition-crisis
dichotomy
Afghanistan’s agricultural economy is
portrayed by many observers as a “traditional”
or even “medieval” subsistence-based system
of isolated farmers using techniques that
have remained unchanged for centuries.
Images such as these stem from the
undercapitalised production systems and
appearance of village life, rather than on an
understanding of the historical processes that
have created the current system. For much
of the past century, Afghanistan has had a
strong, market-oriented agricultural system.
In the 1960s, it was one of the largest
exporters of dried fruit (particularly raisins)
and karakul lambskins in the world. This
brought significant wealth to the north of
the country. Massive development aid was
invested in irrigated agriculture in the south,
resulting in major transformations in
agricultural systems. Although far from all
of these changes were positive for farmers
and rural livelihoods, they have produced
a current agricultural context that has
more to do with adaptation to episodic
development interventions, recurrent
drought, periodic conflict and the regional
politico-economic situation than to
“tradition.”
The programmatic structure of agricultural
rehabilitation and development efforts is
not congruent with the actual nature of
Afghan agriculture and processes of
recovery in farming and livelihoods. The
rapid expansion of  agr icultural
rehabilitation assistance after the fall of
the Taliban was not in response to a new
crisis caused by the conflict, which only
had an incremental and primarily indirect
impact on agriculture. The gradual erosion
of formal institutions, infrastructure and
market structures, and the ample
opportunities for predatory behaviour by
local commanders have had more impact
than bombs and bullets. The “crisis” in
agriculture was, and in some ways still is,
caused by a combination of drought,
chronically weak governance and disrupted
markets. The “monotonous landscape of
interventions”9 that makes up aid response
has been only marginally related to the
diversity of challenges faced by rural
people struggling to maintain their
livelihoods as governments have come and
gone. Thus, aid agendas have been largely
out of step with humanitarian and
development needs in rural Afghanistan.
The central reason that the aid agenda is
not in line with the realities of agricultural
production and livelihoods is that a “crisis
narrative” shapes aid response. The history
of intermittent coping, recovery and
destruction of the past 25 years is glossed
2. The Context of Agricultural Rehabilitation and
Development
9 Pain, 2002, op cit., 11.
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over by media images of systemic breakdown.
Under the Taliban, before the beginning of
the drought in the late 1990s, cereal
production was recovering well and in 1995,
livestock numbers were greater than they
were in the mid 1960s.10 The lessons of these
past recovery processes are rarely alluded
to, much less analysed, in current planning
efforts. Similarly, the ingenuity of farmers
in experimenting with new production
methods and markets is ignored in the face
of efforts to raise funds and deliver supplies
to beneficiaries who are assumed to have
nothing. Pressures for finding quick fixes to
extremely complex problems stem from fears
that narco-mafias, gaining sustenance from
rapidly increasing opium production, will
undermine the grand post-2001
nation-building project.
Currently, it is only possible to
provide a series of snapshots
of a transitional period where
the government is struggling
to reassume the duties that the
international community has
held during recent years. It is
unclear what the roles of the
state, civil society, the aid
community and the private
sector will be in driving future
agricultural rehabilitation and
development. It is also unclear
if and how the state will be
able to take a stronger stance
on land grabbing, insecurity and other features
of rural life in Afghanistan today. Much will
depend on how these different actors succeed
in rebuilding the infrastructure of agricultural
and social services.
Another integral aspect of the context that
delineates the interplay between policies,
programmes, governance and agricultural
development is the role of the international
community. Afghanistan is not governed by
a UN transitional administration. The
recognised government has, however, very
little resources of its own and the aid
community is still retaining a very tight grip
on the purse strings. Considerable and
laudable effort has gone into fostering
government ownership of budgeting and policy
formation processes, but in many respects
Afghanistan functions under a quasi-
transitional administration supported by the
UN and the international community more
generally. This rather hazy situation is
characterised by uncertain accountabilities
to the population, uncertain leadership of
agricultural development programming and
inconsistent use of rewards and punishments
to prod the policy process.
It should also be stressed that Afghanistan is
an extremely diverse country with many
different microclimates and local historically
rooted social, political and economic
structures. These exist independently, but
at the same time have developed unique
ways of linking to national and international
structures. Despite the seeming isolation of
the distant mountain valleys, and the unique
trajectories they have followed, even the
most remote regions have been profoundly
10 Italtrend. Pre-feasibility for Animal Health in Afghanistan. Report for the European Union. 2003.
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affected by the upheavals of recent and past
years. One researcher writes of the isolated
Pamirian Knot that:
“The observation that the effects of
international politics reach deep into
the peripheral valleys and plateaux
of remote high mountain regions might
be surprising for some, but confirms
that the concept of security survival
overrides the idea of these areas as
refugia.”11
Afghan agricultural institutions
A central aspect of the reconstruction and
rehabilitation architecture in Afghanistan is
the pressure to identify, build, create or
strengthen “implementing partners,” that is
to say, formal organisations that can receive
and utilise aid flows. This narrow focus
distracts from the need to take into account
the wider formal and informal institutions
that farmers rely upon to access capital,
inputs, markets and knowledge in order to
maintain their production, profitability and
livelihoods. There is a tendency to miss the
forest for the trees when efforts are made
to build, for example, a village seed
production cooperative, without first
considering what the informal channels and
rules are that have long governed how
effectively farmers have been able to access
the seeds they desire.
The formal institutional infrastructure of
Afghan agriculture is extremely weak, and is
comprised of the following:
• Formal trading networks;
• Finance;
• Processing and storage;
• Market information;
• Access to advice and inputs for new
technologies; and
• Formal security of tenure.
These weak institutions preclude rapid
renewal of links to those international markets
that demand agricultural production
characterised by predictability, standardised
quality, timeliness and bulk quantities.
Investments in repairing the physical
infrastructure that was destroyed during the
years of conflict and decline have begun more
rapidly than efforts to rebuild the institutional
infrastructure. Though security problems
have delayed some construction in the south,
progress has been made in other parts of the
country. Some short-term gap filling in
institutional support is underway, particularly
as related to seed access and some extension.
More long-term thinking is starting to be
applied to micro-finance and restructuring
the commodity chains that show economic
potential. This, however, is still almost
entirely in the planning stage. Most observers
doubt that institutional development will
proceed rapidly.12
Pressures to channel aid flows are, by nature,
biased by assumptions that revival of
agricultural production can only be achieved
through re-establishment of formal institutions
for input supply and credit. Aid agencies need
relatively formal institutional counterparts.
Farmers, on the other hand, have less
stringent demands. Experience in Pakistani
cotton farming, for example, has shown that
informal structures can actually provide high
quality agricultural services and even create
effective links to the formal sector.13 There
11 Kreutzmann, H. “Ethnic Minorities and Marginality in the Pamirian Knot: Survival of Wakhi and Kighiz in a Harsh Environment
and Global Contexts.” The Geographical Journal. September 2003. 169(3): 215-235.
12 Some major donors are more optimistic and see institutions as an area where rapid investment is possible. Referring to
the coming five years, a World Bank concept paper states, “Human capital investment and security investments may be
front-loaded, while investment in infrastructure is likely to disburse far more in later years.” (World Bank. Costing the
Public Investment Needed for a Politically and Economically Sustainable Afghanistan, Concept Note. Washington, D.C.:
World Bank. 2003.)
13 Smith, L.E.D., Stockbridge, M. and Lohano, H.R. “Facilitating the Provision of Farm Credit: The Role of Interlocking
Transactions Between Traders and Zaminders in Crop Marketing Systems in Sindh.” World Development. 1999. 27(2): 404-
418.
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are some surprisingly strong informal Afghan
institutions that have appeared in response
to the gap in formal capacity. The Hawala
money exchange system provides an
extraordinarily efficient and reliable structure
for financial transfers that reaches well into
rural areas and greatly facilitates access to
migrant remittances.14 This system is believed
to have originated to support trading along
the Silk Route and became modernised in
South Asia as a way to cope with the
restrictions on financial transfers established
in the India–Pakistan partition.15 It has grown
particularly strong in filling the gap created
by the collapse of formal banking systems in
Afghanistan and Somalia, and even constitutes
a strong competitor to formal banking
structures in other countries, such as
Bangladesh. After being portrayed in the
Western press and by many politicians as a
shady enterprise that finances terrorism after
September 11, views on Hawala have begun
to undergo a reassessment. It is now
increasingly acknowledged to be a highly
efficient and essential structure for linking
the Afghan rural economy to the international
system by channelling vital remittances: “It
can be argued that what Hawala is vilified
for (speed, trust, paperlessness, global reach,
fluidity) are precisely the attributes that
modern globalising investment banking aspires
to.”16
Informal trading networks have also proven
very resilient, building on experience over
the years of re-establishing business when
opportunities have arisen amid recurrent
crises and periods of recovery. The domestic
market for dried fruit has remained strong,
despite the collapse of export markets,17 and
Afghanistan has retained its export market
for pistachios to India, even though production
has shrunk due to destruction of some of the
pistachio forests.
In much agricultural programming the
weaknesses of formal institutions and policies
has led observers to assume that old structures
have collapsed. There is a tendency to set
off upon programming as if there was a blank
slate for designing new policies, institutions
and processes. Plans make few references
to experience from earlier periods of recovery
in the 1990s. The strength of many
governmental institutions (though not
necessarily in agriculture) has caught planners
off guard.18
Regional and international trends
and markets
Just as little attention has been paid to
Afghanistan’s institutional infrastructure,
there also has been little attention paid to
looking at regional and international markets
as key determinants of what might feature
as a driving force for development.19
Afghanistan is not just a country that finds
itself between relief and development. It is
also between the two CAPs. The United
Nations’ Consolidated Appeals Process
provided food and agricultural support during
the emergency years, and in some ways
displaced pressures to see how markets affect
food security. The European Union’s Common
Agricultural Policy is the structure that, along
with other northern subsidies, drastically
influences opportunities to use agricultural
export markets as an engine for development
and poverty alleviation. A financially destitute
state, such as Afghanistan, must look very
14 Maimbo, S.M. The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala System in Afghanistan. World Bank Working
Paper No. 13. Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2003.
15 De Goede, M. “Hawala Discourses and the War on Terrorist Finance, Environment and Planning.” Society and Space. 2003.
21: 513-532.
16 Ibid, 517.
17 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). Afghanistan: Survey of the Horticultural Sector 2003. Kabul:
FAO. 2003.
18 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) and the World Bank. A Guide to Government in Afghanistan. Kabul: AREU
and the World Bank. 2004.
19 One notable exception has been the attention given to international markets for opium.
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closely at whether it can achieve sufficient
productivity levels so as to compete on
international markets when it has little
capacity to provide support to its own farmers.
Aid may remove some of the major barriers
to trade, such as infrastructure and finance,
but it cannot create a level playing field. At
best, development cooperation may create
a limited platform to advocate for more just
international trade policies and to promote
reform of domestic policy to ensure that it
reflects market realities.
Internationally, analyses of food security are
increasingly focused on how households
( r a t h e r  t h a n
countries) access
food. But it has been
noted that this frame
of analysis is out of
sync with parallel
policy formation processes that relate to
accessing international trading markets.
International markets have massive impact
on food security, both through devastating
competition and by providing cheap foodstuffs
to net consumers. This reality is starting to
influence food security analyses and policies.
 Food security concerns have had less impact,
however, in informing trade policies and
strategies to promote export-led growth
through integration with international
markets.20
Afghanistan’s National Development
Framework (NDF) sees the nation’s future as
relying on export, market-led growth.21
Agricultural development trends in the region
and internationally are therefore of great
relevance to decisions regarding how
agriculture could be expected to better
support livelihoods in the future. Reviving
production of wheat, seeds, raisins or cotton
is not just a matter of ensuring that irrigation
systems are rehabilitated and processing
machinery repaired. Marketing conditions,
international prices and the subsidy regimes
of potential competitors in the region are of
utmost relevance in the choice of investment
priorities if livelihood support is to become
sustainable. Many actors within the aid
community are keeping their heads in the
sand on these factors.
Within the limited sphere of interventions
where marketing is being addressed, there
is a strong tendency to stress physical
obstacles to marketing in the form of poor
roads, storage and
processing facilities.
Analysis of market
opportun i t ies  in
n e i g h b o u r i n g
countries and urban
areas are only starting to be undertaken.
This would seem to raise questions about the
basis upon which strategic priorities are being
made for rehabilitation, given the
government’s market-led vision. For example,
a stronger understanding of future potential
markets is indispensable to inform those
choosing priorities for road construction to
achieve maximum benefits for commercial
agriculture.
Why has the government’s policy of market-
led growth not led to greater emphasis on
market analysis? The answer lies in a
continued “triumph of the project.” Duffield
et al. note that under the Taliban, despite
grand statements of commitment throughout
the aid community to the Joint Strategic
Framework for Afghanistan, both donors and
NGOs remained locked into pre-existing
routines and procedures that kept them busy
with picking out projects, rather than
20 Stevens, C., Devereux, S. and Kennan, J. International Trade, Livelihoods and Food Security in Developing Countries. IDS
Working Paper No. 215. Sussex: Institute for Development Studies. 2003.
21 More recently, the principles underlying the NDF were used to inform an action plan outlined in Securing Afghanistan’s
Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward, a publication of the Afghan government and international
agencies. While the author of this paper does not specifically site this publication, he did meet with the chief architects
of Securing Afghanistan’s Future, and many of the ideas contained in that document are addressed herein.
Aid may remove some of the major barriers
to trade, such as infrastructure and finance,
but it cannot create a level playing field.
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implementing policies.22 The
need to have activities that
can be related (however
tenuously) to pictures of
billowing fields of wheat is still
greater than the need to ask
if anyone is ready to buy the
flour. Afghan policy documents
and budgeting structures may
resonate with the rhetoric of
the new market-oriented aid
architecture that is increasingly
dominating the field of
development, but the on-the-
ground programming realities
in the agricultural sector retain
a project-bound tunnel vision.
“New Public Management” and
impediments to policy reform
There is not only a disjunction between the
government’s market visions for agriculture
and the project-bound nature of aid activities,
but between the philosophy underpinning
the role of the state in documents such as
the NDF and the reality of visions within key
ministries relating to agriculture. The NDF
begins by stating that “the people’s
aspirations must be represented and reflected
in an accountable government that delivers
value on a daily basis.” The questions of what
should be delivered and by whom are at the
centre of the debate on what kind of social
contract the Afghan government intends to
establish with its people. The NDF goes on
to specify that “we do not see government
as the producer and manager of the economy,
but as regulator and promoter of the
entrepreneurial energies of the people. The
state will enter into a direct managerial role
only when social justice demands its
presence.” The policy formation process
essentially consists of a gradual bridging of
gaps in different interpretations of what
constitutes a public good, i.e., where the
state could or should step in and where the
market and civil society can be expected to
take the lead, requiring only facilitation and
regulation from the state.
The goal of establishing a facilitating and
regulating state is particularly important to
analyse in agriculture, where states are
conventionally assumed to have a relatively
minor direct role in development and even
the provision of basic services, as compared
to other sectors such as health or education,
where state service provision remains the
norm. Agriculture would appear to be a sector
that should slot in well with the goals of the
government and international community.
An operational consensus has, however, yet
to emerge regarding the role of the state in
agricultural development.
Within the NDF, Afghanistan’s crisis has been
transformed into an opportunity for reform,
as this New Public Management23 (NPM)
inspired structure has been overlaid on the
22 Duffield, M., Gossman, P. and Leader, N. Review of the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research
and Evaluation Unit. 2002.
23 “New Public Management” is a term used to refer to the models for attempting to minimise the role of the state and
increase roles for the private sector and civil society. These models were implemented widely in Europe during the 1980s,
and have since been increasingly promoted as part of structural adjustment programmes in the south and east. More recently
these ideas have gained favour in design of international strategies for rebuilding failed or collapsed states.
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ruins of what was assumed to be a collapsed
state. The formal endorsement of the NPM
approach is widely perceived to be more a
product of donor pressures than domestic
commitment. The continuing strength of
opposition to NPM in the government has
revealed that the state was not as collapsed
as many expected. A set of problems has
emerged in implementing the framework, as
it has gradually been discovered that the
state and civil service have proven to be
surprisingly vigorous and active in striving to
rebuild (rather than reform) their structures
of the past. There is intense pride in the civil
service24 that does not mesh well with the
radical NPM paradigm. Agricultural
stakeholders expect and want the state “to
provide everything.”25 The belief that crisis
inevitably creates opportunities for public
reform has been shown to have been built
more on prevailing
narratives within the
aid community than
on empirical realities.
Afghan politicians and
civil servants have a
different set  of
prerogatives, based
on a different history
and culture than that
of their advisers, and a different set of
political, economic and social pressures.
The advisers may also be directed at
promoting normative reconstruction models,
at the expense of frank analyses of political
processes in contexts of post- and chronic
crisis. Boin and ‘t Hart point out that the
narrative of crisis as an opportunity for reform
is widespread in the north as well, but is
profoundly flawed as “the requirements of
cr is is  management are inherently
incompatible with the requisites for effective
reform.”26 Citizens’ expectations and other
factors put pressures on political leaders (and
in this case, the aid community as well) to
show quick results and provide visible public
services. This is not in tune with NPM models
that suggest that the gap between
government capacity and massive needs can
be used as a stimulus to shift to greater
reliance on the private sector and civil society.
When the current government assumed power,
the vast majority of politicians and civil
servants in agriculture took for granted that
a large and well financed state-led agricultural
development effort was going to be put into
place. That was all they had experienced in
the past and there was little understanding
or awareness of the reform efforts that have
been undertaken throughout the world over
the past two decades. There is a major gap
between the vision for
agriculture and rural
development that is
outlined in the NDF
a n d  p r e v a i l i n g
agricultural policy as
perceived by most of
those working within
the  M in i s t ry  o f
Ag r i cu l tu re  and
Animal Husbandry
(MAAH) and the NGOs providing agricultural
services. Despite the endorsement of new
policy concepts by key actors at the central
level, there is little sign that the new vision
for the state is either understood or accepted
at other levels. One donor assistance strategy
notes that “Ownership within individual ATA
[Afghanistan Transitional Authority] ministries
[for the NDF] varies.”27 The government has
acknowledged this openly as well.28
Provincial and district officials retain the
view that since agriculture is the “backbone”
24 AREU and the World Bank, op cit.
25 Hemani, M. Agriculture and Rural Development Ministrie’s (sic) Level Strategy Development Workshop, 28 September – 2
October 2003, Kabul. Kabul: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. 2003.
26 Boin, A., and ‘t Hart, P. “Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible?” Public Administration Review. September
2003. 63(5): 544-553.
27 Department for International Development (DFID). DFID Transitional Country Assistance Plan Afghanistan 2003-2004. Western
Asia Department, DFID. August 2003, 5.
28 Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). From Humanitarian Assistance to Social Protection. Paper prepared
for the Afghanistan Support Group Oslo Meetings. Kabul: MRRD. December 2002.
There is a major gap between the vision
for agriculture and rural development that
is outlined in the NDF and prevailing
agricultural policy as perceived by most of
those working within the Ministry of
Agriculture and Animal Husbandry (MAAH)
and the NGOs providing agricultural
services.
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of the local economy, this therefore justifies
state dominance in both financing and
provision of agricultural services and in
planning production priorities. There is as
yet little public discussion of alternative
visions for the sector at provincial and district
levels. A majority of those in provincial and
district political and civil service structures
involved in agriculture retain expectations
of a return to state-led development,
requiring a large bureaucracy and public
service provision. Even relations to civil
society are assumed to require a strong
leading role for the state. For example, plans
are being put into place for a vast expansion
of government advisers and subsidy structures
to guide a revival of agricultural cooperatives.
Agencies including the UN Food and
Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) and the UK
Department for International Development
(DFID) are investing in capacity building for
the MAAH in order to increase the awareness
of key staff of current international norms
and practices within ministries of agriculture
and the public sector. Most acknowledge that
these efforts have as yet made limited
headway. Even where NPM has been accepted,
there is no consensus regarding what a
facilitating and regulating state actually
consists of on the ground, and what could be
done to promote the growth of private and
civil society structures that the state should
eventually facilitate and regulate. The blame
does not necessarily lie with aid efforts per
se, but rather with a high level of uncertainty
within the system about what capacities
should be built. The implications of the NDF
for setting priorities have only just begun to
be absorbed at an overarching conceptual
level. Genuine, widespread and sustainable
ownership may only be expected to emerge
once it is determined what these concepts
imply with regard to who does what in
extension, cooperatives, veterinary services,
etc.
Ambivalence toward NPM extends beyond
the government. Most NGOs, which are
currently the main operational actors in
provision of agricultural services, have yet
to consider how to align the trajectories of
their programmes with the NDF. Programmes
tend to reflect a de facto assumption that
all agricultural services are public goods, and
that the creation of a market for private
services is a matter that will have to be dealt
with in the distant future (i.e., by someone
else). Even the opportunity to access support
for more private sector-oriented programming
from the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) has not stimulated a
major change in direction. The services that
the NGOs provide are not dissimilar to those
that the state actors would like to assume.
The prospects of sustainability are not
significantly better in their initiatives than
in government services, since their efforts
are not anchored in local resource flows,
either through the market or civil society.
Most aid-financed agricultural programmes
do not provide an alternative vision for how
agricultural services could be organised, but
instead are mere bypass structures in which
NGO staff provide the same services that the
government agencies expect and hope that
they should be given responsibility for.
Within the government’s consultative group
and budgeting structure, the MAAH is
responsible for the natural resources
management sector, but not for livelihoods
and social protection, which is allotted to
the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development (MRRD), with support from the
World Food Programme (WFP) and others.
While there are practical reasons for this
division, and it is uncertain whether the MAAH
would be able to effectively engage in yet
another set of policy reform initiatives, this
structure has hindered efforts to see how
agriculture contributes to the protection of
livelihoods. Neither the MAAH nor FAO have
been actively engaged in discussions of the
large social protection programmes that are
just starting. Opportunities have thus been
missed for seeing how agricultural
programming could better contribute to
reducing vulnerability.
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It would seem a paradox that agriculture is
a sector that has been wary to accept the
NPM vision proposed in the NDF, given that
agriculture is by nature an area where the
private sector is inevitably the key driving
force. There are several reasons for this:
• Agriculture has been seen as the primary
vehicle of state-led modernisation since
the time of the massive U.S.-financed
Helmand Valley Project in the 1960s.
• The background of many bureaucrats in
both the socialist system and exposure
to the former U.S. agricultural system
has underpinned a desire to revive
cooperatives.29
• Aid structures that demand encapsulated
and quick impact projects cannot deal
with an unruly and unpredictable private
sector.
• There is a desire within the agricultural
bureaucracy to re-establish its legitimacy
through patronage and largesse.
Against the backdrop of these factors,
government agricultural officials at district
and provincial levels observe NGOs distributing
free hand-outs and naturally wish to do the
same. They perceive NGOs to be the tenacious
remnants of a surrogate state that was
created during the war. They see their role
as being one of taking back the responsibilities
that they once had and that NGOs have
currently taken upon themselves. Supply-
driven programming is assumed to be the
norm. Given the absence of alternative
models, it would be surprising if they had
any different expectations.
Government officials are extremely frustrated
that the international donor community does
not help them to develop their legitimacy in
a similar manner as NGOs have done. This is
grounded in the perceived gap between donor
rhetoric about strengthening the government
and funding priorities via NGOs. Local officials
have little understanding of how aid agencies
determine priorities and modalities and
experience a sense of powerlessness in
influencing the agricultural programming
under way in their jurisdictions. NGOs are
seen to be totally unaccountable to
government for the quality or impact of their
agricultural programmes, further fuelling
envy and anger.
Despite some progress in “convincing” high-
level officials of the need for a lean state,
there is no clear agenda for establishing the
concrete tasks of the public sector in either
Kabul or the rest of the country. The plans
of agricultural departments at provincial and
district levels essentially consist of requesting
funding from Kabul for the provision of free
services and waiting for a response. They
rarely receive one. Discussing public
administration more generally, it has been
observed that “since December 2001,
provincial and district staff essentially have
been waiting to hear from Kabul.”30 There
is some hope that the tables will be turned
between the state and NGOs when the
National Solidarity Programme (NSP) gets
under way. At the district level, there are
some optimistic hopes that NSP funds will be
used for such services, including tractor-
ploughing schemes and flour mills (i.e., areas
that the private sector would seem to be
expected to dominate within a vision of a
facilitating and regulating state).
Operational priorities and the
policy process
In lieu of a broad-based policy implementation
process, programmes and projects (current
or hoped for) have become the proxy for
actionable policies. The need to build the
legitimacy of the central government (and
29 U.S.-supported cooperative development, including 4-H clubs, was part of the social engineering strategy of the Helmand
Valley Project. (See Cullather, N. “Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State.” The Journal of American History.
September 2002. 512-537.)
30 AREU and the World Bank, op cit., 4.
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the weakness of the formal private sector)
has meant that aid flows through the state
are increasing. There is a pragmatic
acceptance that something needs to be done
to help get Afghanistan on its feet, and that
the process of developing capacity in policy
analysis and implementation cannot be sped
up sufficiently to use policy as a basis for
tightly coordinating and prioritising
expenditures. A significant element of supply-
side programming is accepted as a necessary
evil.
One result of this is that competition over
supplies and over speed in expending them
(and achieving “quick impacts”) has in some
ways taken precedence over coordination
and strategic direction. The “triumph of the
project” continues to prevail. One evaluation
from 2002 goes so far as to state that “current
reconstruction practice — what agencies
actually do and how they do it — in practice
bears more resemblance to regionalism and
warlordism than to a coherent and effective
aid programme.”31 Coordination has improved
since then, but is still rudimentary in many
respects. Few would describe Afghan
agricultural development efforts as a shining
example of “good donorship.”
The reform narrative, as embodied in the
NDF, has its roots in efforts around the world
to reduce the role and scale of state
bureaucracies and create a lean state. A
paradox in Afghanistan is that, although there
is a need to scale down the visions and hopes
of returning to organisational models from
the 1960s and 1970s, there is presently little
agricultural bureaucracy to actually retrench.
Instead there is a need to expand to meet
the challenges of a facilitating and regulating
state. There is a contradiction between the
retrenchment narrative and the actual make-
up of the agricultural civil service. For
example, even if the state was to withdraw
from direct service provision, the challenges
it faces in shouldering the regulatory and
facilitatory tasks envisaged in the NDF are
enormous. Key exports are currently in
violation of many countries’ phytosanitary
import regulations. Border controls, inspection
of imported fertiliser and pesticides and the
need to monitor and regulate a transparent
system for agricultural finance are all pressing
needs.
In addition, there is a growing portfolio of
projects and programmes, ostensibly under
the leadership of the MAAH, that need to be
facilitated and regulated. There is a very
real disjuncture between aims of making
space for the private sector and the need for
massive investment in public goods and in
promoting the legitimacy of the state. Plans
for contracting out public services have not
been anchored in a parallel agenda of ensuring
state capacity to act as a smart buyer of
these services when they are publicly
financed.
The government has not yet ventured into
this process, either because it still harbours
hopes that it will do it all itself, or because
donors do not trust the government enough
to channel funds through its coffers.32 The
growing scale of programming bears with it
a danger of creating further alienation of the
agricultural bureaucracy from the aid
bureaucracy if a more integrated modus
operandi is not established. The gap between
rhetoric about ownership and the reality of
continued bypass structures is creating
disillusionment. Donors, advisers and NGO
staff are openly frustrated about what are
seen to be antiquated views within the civil
service, but there is a significant vacuum of
ideas about how to bridge the divide.
31 Kampenaar, K., Silken, T. and Pain, A. DACAAR Mid-Term Review. June 2002.
32 Considerable effort has been devoted to pressuring the aid community to work within the National Development Budget,
with coordination managed through a system of consultative groups. Without belittling the considerable successes of this
process at a macro level, it has yet to become a mechanism that addresses issues related to public/private roles and
responsibilities at an operational level.
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It is easy to blame implementing actors in
the government, FAO and NGOs for allowing
programming to displace the policy debate,
but thus far funding horizons have been very
short, and therefore provide little space for
policy development to move from talk to
action. A number of policy advisers are
scattered throughout the ministry offices in
Kabul. At provincial and district levels,
however, small delivery-oriented projects
are still far easier to fund than diffuse
capacity-building initiatives. FAO’s structure
of field-level offices would seem to provide
a relatively solid platform for a broader
normative commitment to coordinated policy
reform. But these offices are starting to be
dismantled as the emergency funding that
sustained them is reduced.
When funding is only available for one to two
years, as is currently the norm, strategic
thinking is unlikely to emerge. The phasing
out of emergency funding has yet to be
matched by an increase in development
spending.33 Operational agencies are being
criticised for being stuck in humanitarian
modalities, but funding structures have not
been supportive of those actors who wish to
take on a more strategic agenda. There is
somewhat of a chicken or the egg situation
with regard to international NGOs and UN
agencies building their own capacity for long-
term thinking (to in turn build Afghan capacity
for the same). NGOs and UN agencies are
criticised for their failure to adapt to the
new situation, but as long as funding is so
uncertain, they have good cause not to risk
investing their own resources in gearing up
for long-term strategic initiatives.
Furthermore, it may be unethical to raise
expectations among farmers, extension agents
and private actors by trying to establish more
sustainable relations between agricultural
service providers and their clients when
support is in danger of being discontinued in
a matter of months. Operational agencies
are in many respects acting in an ethically
correct manner in refusing to invest in
sustainable micro-finance, extension or
research initiatives that may need to be
closed after a few months.
A further disjuncture in current agricultural
policies and programming is how best to
combine social and economic objectives. The
efficiency focus of the governmental role
envisaged in the NDF is paired with social
objectives that stress inclusion, equity and
justice. It is not self evident how the former
will lead to the latter. The working assumption
appears to be that an effective, strong, but
realistically focused central government is a
precondition for pursuing objectives of equity
and social justice. This is an assumption that
is common in NPM reform efforts: “…social
justice is a star in the NPM firmament, set
to shine more brightly as NPM tenets take
increased hold.”34 It is worth noting, however,
that the process by which efficiency in the
agricultural bureaucracy is expected to impact
on the well-being of vulnerable rural
households is not explicit.  Reform may be a
pre-requisite for pro-poor and equitable
development, but it is not a guarantee. It
would seem irresponsible to wait for resurgent
conflict as an indicator that social objectives
have not been realised.
33 The major exception to this is the large USAID-funded RAMP program, though many observers express concerns that domestic
political pressures may result in this “development” programme being unduly directed at quick fixes.
34 Harrow, J.  “New Public Management and Social Justice: Just Efficiency or Equity as Well?” In McLaughlin, K., Osborne,
S.P. and Ferlie, E., eds.  New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects. London & New York: Routledge.
2002, 141.
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In addition to understanding the context of
agricultural rehabilitation and development
in Afghanistan, it is critical to discuss what
is known about Afghan livelihoods and labour
before assessing the relevance of agricultural
programming. This chapter first examines
the relationship between agriculture and the
actual livelihoods of rural people in high and
low potential areas. It then looks at food
security and food consumption in terms of
changing livelihood strategies and levels of
agricultural production. Having demonstrated
that subsistence farming is but one aspect
of how rural people survive, the chapter ends
with a focus on non-farm labour and migration
as crucial livelihood strategies.
Agriculture and livelihoods in high
and low potential areas
International findings are increasingly
indicating that the impact of changing
policies, institutions and markets differs
dramatically between high and low potential
agricultural areas. “Pro-poor growth”
in i t iat ives  and market
integration generally have
much more to offer farmers in
areas that can directly take
advantage of the opportunities
presented.35 The hinterlands
offer poorer prospects for many
of the strategies that have
been promoted as ways to
“escape” from poverty.
Instead, realistic assessments
usually point to the need to
enhance coping strategies and
ways to promote inclusive
development in the face of
d e c l i n i n g  c o m m e r c i a l
investment and security.
The examples provided in Boxes 1 and 2
illustrate the varying influences of market
access, labour markets, natural conditions,
security and history in different parts of the
country. Hazarajat and Kunduz are examples
from contrasting ends of the Afghan spectrum
of rural development trends. The former is
grappling with isolation, depopulation and
poor market prospects. The latter is engaged
in commercial production, but faces
difficulties in looking beyond pre-war
production patterns to the market realities
of today, and the implications of this for
investment and rehabilitation priorities.
Hazarajat is not without potential, but when
viewed through the lens of experience
elsewhere in the world in development (or
lack thereof) in isolated, mountainous areas,
it appears unlikely that agriculture will provide
a sufficient “engine of growth” to reverse
long-term trends toward economic decline.
Agriculture is more likely to be one of a
number of coping strategies for a population
3.  What is Known About Livelihoods and Labour
35 Ashley, C. and Maxwell, S. “Rethinking Rural Development.” Development Policy Review. 2001. 1119(4): 395-425.
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Box 1: Example of a low potential area: Hazarajat
Hazarajat is a poor and isolated mountainous region of central Afghanistan with relatively little arable land.
Crops (primarily wheat) are mostly produced in narrow irrigated valleys, with some rain-fed crops being
planted on surrounding hillsides when precipitation permits. The mountainous topography makes transport
difficult and puts Hazarajat’s agriculture at a disadvantage in accessing urban (Kabul) markets. Hazarajat
is a chronic food deficit area. Livelihoods are heavily dependent on sales of livestock and migration to make
up for this deficit. Hazarajat is known for its out-migration, both to Kabul and internationally. Iran is the
preferred destination, since many Hazara are Shi’a and feel safer among people of their own religion. Some
areas have had a pattern of seasonal migration, mostly to Kabul, during the winter months.36
The isolation of Hazarajat has by no means meant that farmers are hesitant about trying new technologies.
Poppy cultivation is currently expanding “spectacularly,”37 even to areas where it has never been grown
before. Potato production is also expanding rapidly. This year potatoes are a major commercial crop, used
in rotation with winter wheat. There is a readiness to invest in new machinery as well, as exemplified by
some farmers purchasing mechanical threshers after observing a project managed threshing pilot.38
Hazarajat’s small and isolated valleys display extraordinary diversity in terms of local socio-economic relations
and impact from conflict and drought. In some districts extreme “feudal”39 relations exist. In other districts
and valleys, sharecroppers have regained direct ownership of their land as former Kuchi landlords have
fled.40 Many commanders are adapting to the coming of peace to the province by becoming landlords through
land grabbing and other abuse of their power.41 Current analyses emphasise the massive impact of the
drought on agriculture in Hazarajat, which devastated agricultural production. The uncertainties surrounding
rain-fed agriculture in Hazarajat and skewed land ownership suggest that livestock is a more viable production
strategy for the poor than crops. Some agency representatives acknowledge this. Subsidised veterinary
services are, however, the only aid response under way. On a national level, some have called for “aggressive
post-drought programs to restore livestock bases.”42 However, there is a lack of surplus animals throughout
Afghanistan and with the extremely weak inspection and quarantine structures, imports from neighbouring
countries would be very risky.43
Hazarajat has attracted a considerable number of agencies over the years, but most have had relatively
small programmes. One observer writes that, during the 1990s, “…at no stage has the volume of assistance,
by any measure, been significant relative to the scale of the area economy.”44 Agricultural programming
remains primarily oriented to seed distribution. Oxfam and the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) are
engaged in major long-term rural development programmes, both of which are struggling to refocus efforts
away from the past seed focus. They are both experiencing difficulty in renegotiating operational relationships
with the shuras45 with which they work. FAO is starting to implement a large and ambitious DFID-financed
programme focused on enhancing rural livelihoods through first developing shuras and other institutions to
act as farmer organisations.
36 Johnson, C. Hazarajat Baseline Study – Interim Report. Kabul: UN Coordinator’s Office. 2000.
37 Solidarités. Reinforcement of Food Security, in order to Stabilize Local Populations and to Favour the Return of Displaced
Persons and Refugees, Intermediate Report Period from April 1, 2002 – April 1, 2003. Kabul: Solidarités. 2003, 26.
38 Solidarités, 2003, op cit.
39 The term “feudal” is used to describe a diverse variety of unequal and exploitive social relations in studies of local land
tenure systems and political structures in rural areas.
40 Alden Wily, L. Land Relations in Bamyan Province: Findings from a 15 Village Case Study. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and
Evaluation Unit. 2004.
41 Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC). Speaking Out. Kabul: HRRAC. November 2003.
42 Lautze, S., Stites, E., Nojumi, N. and Najimi, F. Qaht-e-Pool “A Cash Famine”: Food Insecurity in Afghanistan 1999-2002.
Medford, Massachusetts: Feinstein International Famine Center. 2002.
43 Solidarités, 2003, op cit.
44 Semple, M.  Strategies for Support of Sustainable Rural Livelihoods for the Central Highlands of Afghanistan. Islamabad:
Pattan Development Organisation. 1998.
45 Shura is the term used for an array of community councils that provide both traditional governance and an interface for
managing aid-financed rural development programmes.
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Box 2: Example of a high potential area: Kunduz
Kunduz Province is located on the border of Tajikistan, west of the Hindu Kush. Agricultural land primarily
consists of irrigated lowlands, rain-fed plains and low hills. Relatively abundant rainfall and higher land
fertility make rain-fed production more reliable and important than in Hazarajat.  The major crops are wheat,
rice and cotton. The province produces a significant cereal surplus. Reliable statistics are not available, but
wheat and rice appear to be primarily used for sales rather than for subsistence. Cotton was very important
in the past and was the motor for commercial and irrigation investment in the region. In many respects
Kunduz’s cotton economy was a model for the state-led agricultural development policies of the last century.
Until a major land reclamation programme in the 1930s, much of Kunduz was a sparsely populated malarial
swamp.46 With the start of development efforts, the population grew rapidly and the Spinzar Corporation
became the primary motor of the cotton economy of Kunduz and neighbouring provinces. Started in 1936
by a group of traders, Spinzar was purchased by the government in 1944.47 It still exists as a state-owned
enterprise. With the war, cotton production and related services rapidly collapsed. All sub-offices of the
Spinzar Corporation outside of Kunduz town were destroyed. Cotton production began to be revived under
the Taliban, but at a very low level. Efforts to re-establish production have begun again. Much of the machinery
owned by the Spinzar Corporation is still in working order or could be easily repaired,48 but operating costs
are high due to the age of the machinery and the need to rely on generators for power. It is expected that
energy may be imported from Tajikistan in the future.49
The memory of the frontline services provided by the Spinzar Corporation continues to underpin a steadfast
governmental view and widespread farmer hope that development will consist of a restoration of the
production system and services of the past. There is very little awareness of the ways that international
trends, especially subsidies, may affect the future viability of an Afghan cotton industry. European Union
subsidies to Greece, for example, have averaged over 100 percent of farm value since 1997,50 and the U.S.
provides over US$3 billion, or US$230 per acre, to its cotton farmers. Consideration has not been given to
the problems facing the cotton economy in Tajikistan either, where drastic de-mechanisation and de-
capitalisation have been underway51 and where cotton production has had devastating environmental
consequences.52 Neighbouring Uzbekistan is the world’s second largest cotton exporter, with Tajikistan and
Pakistan also major producers that would be expected to provide strong competition to Kunduz cotton
production. The implications of these factors for expectations that the Spinzar Corporation can be returned
to viability appear not to be part of current discussions regarding the future of the cotton economy in Kunduz.
Paradoxically, it is partly the regional threats to Kunduz’s current wheat and rice production that have spurred
hopes that cotton can again emerge as the engine of growth. Wheat and rice prices have sunk in the face
of imports from neighbouring countries with subsidisation policies. Some wheat and rice this year were not
even harvested, as farmers concluded that they could not compete with imports to the food deficit areas
of the south and urban markets due to high labour and transport costs. Labourers used to come to the province
from Badakhshan to work in the wheat harvest, but expansion of poppy production there has reduced
incentives to work in the wheat harvest and drastically increased wages.53
46 Barfield, T.J. “Weak Links on a Rusty Chain: Structural Weaknesses in Afghanistan’s Provincial Government Administration.”
In Shahrani, M.N. and Canfield, R.L., eds. Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press. 1984.
47 Central Asia Development Group (CADG). Spinzar Corporation: An Economic Analysis of the Spinzar Cotton Gin in Kunduz
Province, Afghanistan. Singapore: CADG. 2002.
48 Ibid.
49 Tensions could emerge if this energy is used to revive a cotton industry that would compete with Tajikistan’s own struggling
cotton industry. This could be a particularly sensitive issue if the Spinzar Corporation receives a US$2.5 million grant, as
is currently being considered, since this could be perceived of as an unfair subsidy.
50 Townsend, T. Subsidies Beyond 2006. Washington, D.C.: International Cotton Advisory Committee. 2003.
51 Pomfret, R. “State-Directed Diffusion of Technology: The Mechanization of Cotton Harvesting in Soviet Central Asia.” Journal
of Economic History. 2002. 62(1): 170-188.
52 Spoor, M. “The Aral Sea Basin Crisis: Transition and Environment in Former Soviet Central Asia.” Development and Change.
July 1998. 29(3): 409-435.
53 Maletta, H. Winters of Discontent: Seasonal changes in wages and food prices in Afghanistan, 2002-2003. Discussion Paper.
Kabul: Food and Agriculture Organisation/Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry. 2003.
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that is heavily dependent on migration, wage
labour and government transfers. There is
no international consensus about how to
address the chronic poverty of places like
Hazarajat. Some states have simply ignored
the problem by adopting de facto triage
policies. They have chosen to invest their
shrinking agricultural budgets in higher
potential areas where a financial return on
investment is more likely and where it is
hoped that the private sector will prove
increasingly willing to take over services as
the state retreats to facilitating and regulating
roles.54 This has not necessarily been seen
as a non-pro-poor stance since, given the
limited economic prospects of hinterlands,
the poor are assumed to be better off if they
simply leave.
The massive depopulation of these areas that
many economists had predicted has, however,
not occurred. The World Bank acknowledges
that “one-quarter of the people in developing
countries — 1.3 billion in all — survive on
fragile lands, areas that present significant
constraints for intensive agriculture…The size
of this population is a signal that our
assumptions about the extent and speed of
out-migration have been flawed.”55 Referring
to the Andes, Bebbington describes how,
despite public policies effectively writing off
isolated areas as “non-viable,” people are
choosing to remain by piecing together
livelihoods that rely on combinations of
migration, subsistence agriculture and wage
labour.56 Though migration has certainly
drained these areas of human resources, it
has also offered transnational lifelines that
provide the basis for new forms of livelihoods,
as some family members send back
remittances while other relatives maintain
the family homestead.
Some livelihood strategies, such as narcotics
production, actually thrive on a combination
of access to transnational networks and
distance from public authorities, thereby
providing an attractive comparative advantage
for supposedly non-viable areas. The natural
tendencies to capitalise on these comparative
advantages means that insecurity and conflict
are common features in remote rural areas,
as they feed both on the opportunities that
isolation provides and on the social exclusion,
marginalisation and alienation (particularly
among youth) that result from exclusion from
the dynamism of more integrated areas.57
The disadvantages of withdrawing public
investment from these areas are thus starting
to be acknowledged as being potentially
greater than the losses that are incurred in
supporting agricultural livelihoods that do
not necessarily show a positive rate of return
on direct investments in research and
extension.58
While the need to ensure a strong role for
the state will continue to be a key issue for
Hazarajat, the central question facing high
potential areas such as Kunduz is how to take
advantage of market forces to attract the
much heralded benefits of globalisation.
Hopes for a return to profitability in
commercial wheat production in Kunduz are
rooted in assumptions that the conflict was
the problem that led to the disappearance
of markets. In fact, profitability may actually
have benefited from the isolation from world
prices, which have dropped precipitously
during the past three decades, as indicated
in Figure 1.
54 Christoplos, I. “Natural Disasters, Complex Emergencies and Public Services: Rejuxtaposing the Narratives after Hurricane
Mitch.” In Collins, P., ed. Applying Public Administration in Development: Guideposts to the Future. Chichester: John Wiley
& Sons. 2000.
55 World Bank. Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World: Transforming Institutions, Growth, and Quality of Life, World
Development Report 2003. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 2003, 59.
56 Bebbington, A. “Capitals and capabilities: A framework for analysing peasant viability, rural livelihoods and poverty.” World
Development. 1999. 27(12): 2021-2044.
57 Bird, K., Hulme, D., Moore, K. and Shepherd, A. Chronic Poverty in Remote Rural Areas. CPRC Working Paper No. 13.
Birmingham & Manchester: Chronic Poverty Research Centre. 2002.
58 Farrington, J., Christoplos, I. and Kidd, A. with M. Beckman. Extension, Poverty and Vulnerability: The Scope for Policy
Reform - Final Report. Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Working Paper No. 155.  London: ODI. 2002.
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59 Sloane, P. “Food Security Strategy for Afghanistan (revised version).” Afghanistan Watching Brief (a joint UNDP-WB Project).
Islamabad: United Nations Development Programme/World Bank. 5-6 June 2001; Khan, M.A. Afghanistan: Promotion of
Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Programmes, Extension and Training. Islamabad: Food and Agriculture
Organisation. November 1996.
60 Gill, G.J., Farrington, J., Anderson, E., Luttrell, C., Conway, T., Saxena, N.C. and Slater, R. Food Security and the Millennium
Development Goal on Food Security in Asia. Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Working Paper No. 231. London: ODI.
December 2003.
to food through investment in cereal
production and food aid,59 to a broader view
exploring how an array of different livelihood
strategies impact on food security. It is
increasingly accepted that, for the most
vulnerable sectors of the population, the
problem is not the availability of food, but
rather the assets with which to purchase
food. Throughout the world, and particularly
in Asia, it is becoming apparent that “despite
the fact that food is produced in rural areas,
food security in many countries is higher in
urban areas where power to access is
higher.”60 In the past in Afghanistan, the
focus on production inputs and food aid may
have been a reflection of the limited tools
of the aid community. Problems were defined
by the available solutions. Some current
programming (particularly those in an
emergency mode, focused on wheat seeds
and food aid) retains past assumptions of a
direct production-consumption link, but this
may relate more to opportunistic proposal
writing and pandering to donor expectations
than to genuine convictions that production
Finally, though there is good justification for
a two-pronged development strategy for
places like Kunduz and Hazarajat, this does
not mean that they should be seen as separate
economic spheres.  The fate of Hazarajat
and Kunduz will be increasingly interrelated.
The capacity of Hazarajat to benefit from
agricultural development will relate to access
to cheap wheat and rice from Kunduz and
seasonal labour opportunities. The
competitiveness of Kunduz’s agriculture may
depend on access to cheap labour reserves,
such as those from Hazarajat.
Food security amid changing
livelihood strategies
Levels of agricultural production in high and
low potential areas are also affecting current
thinking around food security and food
consumption around the country. The concept
of food security in Afghanistan is going through
a gradual shift from earlier assumptions that
food security could and would be best
addressed primarily through increased access
Figure 1. World Cereal Prices, 1960-2020
Source: Rosegrant (2001) in Ashley & Maxwell, 2001
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increase is a sufficient guarantee for food
security.
The assumption that increased food security
is best achieved by production increase rests
on an underlying “yeoman farmer” narrative
about Afghanistan being a country primarily
made up of subsistence farmers, i.e., people
who will eat more if they produce more. The
“crisis narrative” depicts the livelihoods of
subsistence farmers as having recently gone
through a severe but temporary disruption.
Among researchers, there is significant
disagreement about the extent to which
Afghan rural livelihoods have undergone a
temporary or permanent shift from
subsistence production to commercial
production and diversified sources of income.
The drought has almost certainly caused a
far greater temporary reliance on access to
cash (rather than subsistence production)
due to the failure of food crops. The reliance
on a cash economy has continued as farmers
struggle to repay debts to traders that were
incurred during the drought.61 In the search
for cash income, household labour resources
have increasingly been shifted to expanding
opium production. This may further lock
families into the cash economy, as they must
purchase more food while they devote
available labour resources to poppy.62 It is
unclear, however, how much poppy production
has actually diverted labour away from other
crops, as the spectacular increases in opium
production in recent years have occurred
parallel to increased production of cereals
and other cash crops.
The process of shifting away from subsistence
production differs profoundly between high
and low potential areas. In Kunduz, for
example, the shift away from subsistence
happened in the 1930s and 1940s, when
draining and irrigation investments paved
the way for commoditisation. In low potential
areas, this process has been more gradual,
influenced by increasing population pressures
and intermittent drought and conflict. It has
been a far less linear process.
There is little consensus about whether food
security interventions in Afghanistan should
even strive to re-establish pre-drought/war
subsistence production patterns. Although
some63 stress that the drought was a highly
exceptional event that disrupted and caused
long-term damage to former subsistence-
focused livelihood strategies, others64 draw
attention to the major role that diversified
livelihood strategies, including migration and
commercial production, have historically
played in the Afghan economy. Widespread
landlessness also suggests that recovery will
not be rapid. Many landless and near landless
are resigned to the need to search for labour
opportunities and do not expect a major
change in their circumstances.65 Alternative
livelihood options have long been pursued in
response to new opportunities, climatic
variability and conflict.
Relationship between agricultural
production and food consumption
Given the crisis narrative that has dominated
efforts over the past two years, there is a
surprising dearth of information about
whether or not the massive swings in food
production have actually had a direct impact
on consumption. Information about nutritional
levels is patchy. What data are available
have, both during and after the drought,
consistently shown surprisingly low levels of
acute malnutrition, paired with very high
levels of chronic and micronutrient
61 Lautze, et al., op cit.
62 Mansfield, D. The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and Reality/ Opium Production in Afghanistan.
Paper prepared for the International Conference on the Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development
Cooperation, Feldafeng/Munich, Germany. January 2002.
63 Lautze, et al., op cit.
64 Pain and Goodhand, op cit.
65 Alden Wily, op cit.
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malnutrition. This suggests that coping
strategies have provided for the most basic
survival needs under very high levels of stress.
Repeated shocks create a situation of chronic
vulnerability. Over 50 percent of children
under five are estimated to be chronically
malnourished.66 Acute malnutrition appears
to be primarily a seasonal problem during
the summer and is related to diarrhoeal
diseases rather than food shortage. Low levels
of acute malnutrition have been interpreted
as suggesting highly equitable distribution of
food within the household.  High rates of
micronutrient malnutrition (and scurvy) point
to the importance of dietary habits, and
possibly food preservation and post-harvest
practices, rather than aggregate cereal
production per se. There is very little
consumption of fruits and vegetables during
the winter months.
Despite the popular conception that
agricultural interventions (particularly
emergency programmes) should address food
security, these findings on diet and nutrition
have had little impact upon programming
priorities. “Hunger” is still used as a
justification for distribution of wheat seeds,
and most fruit and vegetable production
initiatives are primarily promoted for income
generation, rather than consumption. Some
NGOs are pursuing home gardening and other
programmes intended to impact on household
consumption, there are very few post-harvest
and food processing projects that could
address seasonal micronutrient deficiencies.
The vast majority of current operational
programming has been focused on increasing
cereal production through the distribution of
improved wheat seeds. Cereal production
has indeed improved dramatically (even if
the impact of seed programming in
contributing to this increase is not self-
evident). More and cheaper wheat does not,
however, necessarily mean cheaper bread.
Surveys show that urban flour prices in
Fayzabad are the lowest in the country.
Despite this, the price of bread is the highest
in the country. This paradox can best be
attributed to the effect of greater demand
for labour and levels of purchasing power
generated by the opium industry on a non-
tradable commodity such as bread.67 This
should not be taken to suggest that
subsistence production of wheat is greatly
affected by access to labour. In describing
current farming in Badakhshan, the province
with the greatest increase in poppy production
during 2003, Fitzherbert writes:
“Low grain prices do not seem to act as
either a disincentive not to grow wheat
nor directly as an incentive to grow poppy.
Badakhshan farmers are not, nor have
ever been, commercial grain farmers, nor
are their circumstances or agricultural
conditions suitable to become so. Few,
if any, farmers in Badakhshan are self-
sufficient in wheat for their own domestic
consumption and the great majority are
dependant on buying at least part of their
annual needs in the market.  In these
circumstances, generally low wheat prices
suit most people.
“Despite the high price of opium, most
farmers, even those who are seriously
into cultivating poppy, also cultivate
wheat on part of their land.  The
proportion of wheat to poppy usually
increases or decreases with the relative
size of the land holding (the less land the
greater the proportion of poppy to wheat),
but usually 50 percent or more of irrigated
land will be sown to wheat and other
crops.  The instinct to protect domestic
food security as far as possible in an
uncertain world is a very strong one
throughout Afghanistan, no less among
poppy farmers than among others.”68
66 World Food Programme (WFP). Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation – Afghanistan 10233.0, Projects for Executive
Board Approval Agenda Item 6, Executive Board Regular Session, 5-7 February 2003, Rome. 2003.
67 Maletta, Winters of Discontent, op cit.
68 Fitzherbert cited in Maletta, Winters of Discontent, op cit.
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It should be stressed that, due to the lack of
data on rural malnutrition, the relationship
between cereal production and food
consumption in isolated, marginal areas, such
as Hazarajat, can only be speculated upon.
High levels of migration indicate that people
do not remain at home when their own food
production fails, but empirical data on how
people combine their different livelihood
options to secure food in areas such as these
are clearly insufficient to draw reliable
conclusions.
Agriculture and labour markets:
looking beyond the yeoman farmer
Improved support to food security is reliant
on ensuring that programming is more
Box 3: The food aid debate in Afghanistan
There is a lively debate underway regarding the relevance of continued food aid. Cereal production has
reached record levels and wheat prices have in some regions dropped.69 Several agencies have blamed food
aid for this fall in producer prices, and even claim that this has significantly contributed to the increase in
opium production, as food production has become unprofitable.70 Others point out that at its peak, food
aid accounted for only 12 percent of demand.71 According to these observers, the price drop should instead
be attributed to increased domestic production levels and imports of milled flour from neighbouring countries,
some of which have been subsidised for domestic markets in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.72
The assumption that there is a direct trade-off in land use between opium and cereal production is disputed
by the fact that cereal cropping area has increased parallel to increases in poppy production, since few
farmers plant more than a small proportion of their land in poppies.73
Some areas of the country are still experiencing the effects of drought and warfare, with cereal deficits and
high prices as a result. Apart from the urban areas, deficits are primarily in the south (most notably Kandahar,
Uruzgan and Zabul) where the drought has continued and where transport of surpluses from the north are
costly and increasingly subject to security constraints.74 Throughout the country there are significant
segments of the population who apparently lack entitlements to food, through either direct production or
other livelihood strategies. Since procurement, milling and transport constraints are the main reasons for
high prices and lack of access to food in deficit areas, some ask whether imported food aid is an appropriate
response, or if it is feasible to address the handling and entitlements issues instead.
WFP would reply that the answer to this last question is no. Despite its position as the strongest agency in
Afghanistan in terms of logistical field capacity, it is nonetheless too weak to deal with the massive transaction
costs of local procurement and transport, given transport problems and the lack of large grain merchants
in the country. Furthermore, one WFP staff member has stated that “the [Afghan] private sector has almost
no experience of contracted delivery.” If food procurement were to be managed on a market basis, local
purchase would favour regional purchase of grain from neighbouring countries where prices are lower,
institutional and physical infrastructure stronger and quality higher. Few would not argue that there are,
in principle, better ways than food aid to address Afghanistan’s food insecurity, but that there is no quick
fix for addressing the paradox of food distributions after a record harvest in the short-term. For the longer-
term, some donors, most notably the USAID-funded RAMP (Revitalizing Afghanistan’s Agricultural Markets
Program), intend to invest heavily in processing and marketing. If this is successful, more appropriate
modalities can be expected to be available in the future.
69 Favre, R. Contributions to Food Aid Policy Development for Afghanistan: Wheat Balance by Region and Province July 2003.
Kabul: Food and Agriculture Organisation. 2003.
70 Christian Aid. “Against the Grain.” Available at www.reliefweb.int. 15 September 2003; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
(RFE/RL) “Afghan Farmers Say Wheat Subsidies are Hurting Them.” RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 2/31. 28 August 2003.
71 Maletta, Winters of Discontent, op cit.
72 Molla, D. Food Aid, Wheat Prices and Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan: Is there a Link? Kabul: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation
and Development/World Food Programme. 2003.
73 Mansfield, 2002, op cit.
74 FEWS Net. Afghanistan Monthly Food Security Bulletin, August 2003. Kabul: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.
2003; 2.
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75 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes/Government of Afghanistan (UNODC/GoA). Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003.
Kabul: UNODC/GoA. 2003.
76 Mansfield, 2002, op cit.
77 One example of this is the UNODC/GoA Opium Survey 2003, which refers to the population for which opium production has
a “direct role” in their livelihoods as only based on the number of farming households growing opium on their own land.
This thereby ignores the impact of opium on migrant labourers and the indirect impacts on wages and prices created by
the opium economy. Also see Pain, 2002, op cit.
78 Ashley and Maxwell, op cit.
79 Ellis, F. and Biggs, S. “Evolving Themes in Rural Development 1950s-2000s.” Development Policy Review. 2001. 19(4): 437-448.
cognisant of how labour markets interact
with the agricultural economy in rural
livelihoods. Some data collection efforts,
such as the National Risk and Vulnerability
Assessment, are shifting their focus away
from cereal production, to better reflect the
importance of labour in livelihoods. AREU’s
livelihoods monitoring project is also providing
a more solid basis for understanding the ways
that Afghan livelihoods are (and are not)
dependent on smallholder production.
Apart from links to the urban
economy, the major factor in
rural labour markets is opium.
As  A fghan i s tan ’ s  ma in
commercial agricultural crop,
opium is grown on just one
percent of arable land, or less
than three percent of the
irrigated land area.75 It is a
crop that absorbs over eight
times the labour input per unit
of land as wheat.76 This
suggests that the link between
agriculture and livelihoods is
not a matter of how farmers
decide to use their land, but
rather how rural people, landed
and landless, use their labour. Nonetheless,
there is still a tendency to focus on the farm
as the unit for analysis of the rural economy,
which distracts attention from how rural
households relate to the agricultural economy
beyond the farm — if these rural dwellers
are even farmers at all.77
Internationally, there is a growing shift in
rural development thinking away from what
has been called the “yeoman farmer fallacy,”
a belief that virtually all rural people strive
(and should strive) to alleviate their poverty
through increased or more effective
investment in their own household farms.
Instead, there is a realisation that a growing
majority of the rural poor earn most of their
income outside of the homestead farm, and
that in the coming years most of the poorest
half of the rural population will be effectively
landless.78 Ellis and Biggs write: “If a new
paradigm of rural development is to emerge,
it will be one in which agriculture takes its
place along with a host of other actual and
potential rural and non-rural activities that
are important to the construction of viable
rural livelihoods, without undue preference
given to farming as the unique solution to
rural poverty.”79 Agriculture may still be an
important engine of development, but the
poor will primarily benefit (if they benefit
at all) through (a) non-farm jobs as profits
from agriculture are reinvested in other
businesses, (b) by working on large farms or
(c) access to cheaper foodstuffs. Optimists
expect that non-farm rural employment will
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create multiplier effects through “a chain of
increased demand and incomes that cascade
through the hands of poor people.”80 Others
are less sanguine, noting that these
alternatives to farming represent desperate
efforts to survive that rarely provide escapes
from poverty.81 Subsistence production will
remain an important coping strategy,
especially in isolated areas that are poorly
integrated into international markets, but
will represent a shrinking relative proportion
of household assets and investment.
Despite these realisations in the development
field, the yeoman farmer fallacy continues
to permeate much agricultural rehabilitation
policy and programming.82 Food security
interventions are particularly prone to an
implicit reliance on this fallacy, as cereal
production is (often falsely) assumed to have
a direct impact on consumption among
vulnerable people. Conventional seeds and
tool distributions, for example, implicitly
assume that agricultural rehabilitation for
disaster-affected rural populations is
synonymous with helping small, own-account
farmers to re-establish their family farms.
Whilst these yeoman farmers are often
certainly a major target group, they are not
the only — or necessarily the most vulnerable
— group of rural people reliant on agricultural
production. A livelihoods approach to
agricultural rehabilitation requires
transcending the yeoman farmer fallacy and
addressing the complexity of how rural people
“hustle” to survive.
Off- and non-farm labour
One of the narratives that underpins the
yeoman farmer fallacy in chronic conflict and
post-conflict contexts is the assumption that
80 World Bank, Sustainable Development, op cit.
81 Bryceson, D. “Rural Africa at the crossroads: Livelihood practices and policies.” In Natural Resource Perspectives 52. London:
Overseas Development Institute. 2000.
82 Christoplos, I., Longley, C. and Slaymaker, T. The Changing Roles of Agricultural Rehabilitation: Linking Relief, Development
and Support to Rural Livelihoods. Unpublished paper. 2004.
83 Asian Development Bank. Natural Resources and Agriculture Sector Medium Term Development Framework Multi-Donor
Phase II Mission. April 2002.
conflict reverses “normal” development
trends by wreaking havoc on markets, and
pushes people away from labour markets and
back towards subsistence. There is no sign
of this in Afghanistan. Labour markets in the
cities and in poppy production are of
increasing importance. The conflict has
probably resulted in an increased shift to
reliance on wage labour as farmers struggle
to obtain cash to pay off debts and regain
access to land that has been mortgaged to
creditors. It has been estimated that 65
percent of farming families depend heavily
on off-farm income.83
After the fall of the Taliban, many observers
feared that labour markets would be swamped
by the massive return of refugees and
internally displaced persons (IDPs). These
fears have proven unwarranted. The opium
and construction booms, as well as the revival
of cash crops and rapid expansion of
infrastructure rehabilitation, have all provided
employment opportunities. In more isolated
areas the benefits have primarily occurred
through opportunities for migrants, while in
others there has been a rapid inflation of
wages.
The opium economy is not the only reason
that the demand for farm labour has remained
strong. Agricultural mechanisation declined
during the conflict due to destruction of
assets, shortage of capital and the high risk
of capital investment due to theft. Anecdotal
evidence indicates that investment in tractors
is now increasing rapidly. This may only be
partly due to improved security. Labour
shortages and lack of oxen are other major
factors.
During the height of the drought, the urban
service sector provided a vital source of
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income for those affected.84 Surveys shortly
after the fall of the Taliban suggested that
labour markets were weakening, and with
that purchasing power.85 More recently, it is
clear that the picture is more positive, with
strong demand and rising wages in many
urban and peri-urban areas (Figure 2).86 In
the past, migration to neighbouring countries
was a much preferred option due to higher
wages, but there are initial indications that
the cities in Afghanistan are becoming a more
attractive option due to the lower
transportation costs and ability to return
home more regularly.87 The popular
conception of urban labour as being a
relatively risky and perilous survival strategy
can be disputed. Terms of trade between
wages and wheat in Kabul have been
remarkably constant over the years,88
suggesting that, compared with Afghanistan’s
other high-risk survival strategies, urban wage
labour is a relatively secure livelihood option,
as evidenced in Figure 2.
There are great geographic and seasonal
variations in the interplay between agriculture
and rural labour markets. In isolated areas
with very small land holdings, there is a
relatively small market for labour. In more
accessible areas, such as near Herat, labour
markets have long been reported to be
strong89 and local officials have been
concerned that IDP camps could actually act
as a (subsidised) magnet for seasonal labour
migrants, providing free food and shelter and
thereby distorting normal migration
patterns.90 Near Kabul, there are many
reports of unmet demand for labour in peri-
urban agriculture, particularly at harvest
time. The demand for semi-skilled labour for
the opium harvest is assumed to be the
greatest factor in rural labour markets, with
reports of wages as high as US$15 per day
for skilled harvesters. Wheat farmers in
Badakhshan have complained of increasing
labour costs due to the expansion of poppy
production.91 Farmers in Kunduz express
84 Pain and Goodhand, op cit.
85 Lautze, et al., op cit.
86 Maletta, H. Women at Work: Gender, wages and employment in rural Afghanistan 2002-2003. Discussion Paper. Kabul: Food
and Agriculture Organisation/Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry. 2003; Maletta, H. Wages of War, Wages of Peace:
Food Prices and Unskilled Labour Pay in Afghanistan 1996-2002. Kabul: Afghanistan Food Security Monitoring Programme.
2002.
87 Kerr-Wilson, A. and Pain, A. Three Villages in Alingar, Laghman: Understanding Rural Livelihoods. Kabul: Afghanistan
Research and Evaluation Unit. November 2003.
88 Maletta, 2002, op cit.
89 Allen, M. Feasibility Studies on the Social and Economic Aspects of Agricultural Production. Kabul: Danish Committee for
Aid to Afghan Refugees. 1999.
90 Christoplos, I. Evaluation Report: The Humanitarian Accountability Project’s Second Trial in Afghanistan, May-July 2002.
2002.
91 Molla, op cit.
Source: Maletta, Winters of Discontent, 2003
Figure 2: Daily wages of urban unskilled labour, 2002-2003 (in US$ per day)
Issues Paper Series
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)28
92 Kerr-Wilson and Pain, op cit.
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94 Kerr-Wilson and Pain, op cit.
95 Kreutzmann, op cit.
96 Pain and Goodhand, op cit.
97 Pain and Goodhand, op cit. de Weijer, F. Pastoralist Vulnerability Study. Kabul: AFSU/VAM Unit of the World Food Programme.
2002.
98 Ibid.
similar concerns. There are some anecdotal
reports that it is becoming difficult to find
sharecroppers in the main poppy growing
areas, since the profits from daily wage labour
are perceived to be more reliable. Very
remote areas with little demand for wage
labour have not experienced such inflationary
pressures. In Hazarajat, for example, agencies
involved in contracting labour for
infrastructure rehabilitation report some
inter-agency competition due to wage
differentials, but no pressure on wages from
alternative agricultural wage labour.
Gender is also a central factor in labour
markets, though not always in the ways that
are commonly assumed. Empirical research
is showing that there is great diversity in
women’s access to income-generating
opportunities across different ethnic groups,
wealth status and other variables.92 Women
gain a large proportion of their income from
non-agricultural activities, though very poor
women depend to a large degree on
agriculture.93 It is unclear whether women
would benefit more from subsistence
production or from enhanced opportunities
for paid employment in processing. Some
women, widows in particular, who own land
but lack the capacity for heavy agricultural
tasks, arrange to have sharecroppers farm
their land while they seek alternative
employment. Women are very much involved
in processing activities, such as cleaning and
preparing seed and fruit. Increased investment
in seed enterprises and food processing will
(if successful) impact greatly on the demand
for these tasks. It is unclear if this will reduce
employment opportunities or give women a
greater opportunity to engage in potentially
more profitable or otherwise more valued
activities. This would seem to be an important
issue to monitor in the future.
The potential of indirectly supporting the
livelihoods of the poor by helping wealthier
farmers to invest in expanding cash crop
production and thereby create labour
opportunities is an area that deserves further
attention.94 The MAAH stresses the need for
promoting labour intensive production
methods, but it is unclear which crops and
production methods are expected to result
in more jobs, especially given the current
wage inflation. If labour opportunities within
the wider commercialisation of agriculture
were to be promoted, a seemingly obvious
strategy would be to look at where incentives
may lie for encouraging the reinvestment of
opium profits (by far the largest source of
wealth currently being accumulated in rural
Afghanistan) into other areas of agricultural
production, processing and other businesses.
Expanded agricultural production will lead
to expanded trade, which in itself is a major
source of employment. Especially in many
border areas, porterage and petty trade —
both often connected to smuggling — have
long provided important, though high risk,
labour opportunities.95 The Kuchis in
particular have traditionally been involved
in trans-border trading and transport,96 as
well as domestic trade.97 Pastoralism has
traditionally been combined with other ways
of benefiting from mobility, with transhumant
livestock production being only one
component of Kuchi livelihoods. The relative
importance of pastoralism itself has varied
considerably due to both crises and
opportunities.98
Migration
Studies of Afghan political, social and cultural
structures inevitably stress the gulf between
rural and urban areas, especially between
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rural areas and Kabul. This “mud curtain” is
generally described as being at the core of
virtually all conflict over the past century.
Without disputing the validity of these
theories for illustrating the tensions in Afghan
society, analysis of livelihoods draws attention
to relations that bridge this dichotomy. The
choice of the majority of returning refugees
to settle in urban areas indicates a response
to several factors:
• Push and pull of urbanisation;
• Loss of assets that make rural livelihoods
unviable;
• Preference for continued urban lifestyles
by returning refugees; and
• Shortage of off-farm employment in
isolated rural areas that rules out a
gradual re-accumulation of assets through
rural livelihoods alone.
An overall understanding of labour markets
indicates that, both in terms of securing
livelihoods and stimulating economic growth,
labour force mobility is in many respects a
highly positive factor. This runs counter to
the views and stated objective of many NGOs
in “helping people to stay in their villages.”
With the exception of pastoralism, migration
is seen by many agencies and some
researchers99 as a symptom of failed
livelihoods, not as a solution to inherently
weak local subsistence and market economies.
The assumption that migration is inevitably
and inherently bad underpins fixed
programming that takes farming to be the
norm and consequently distorts programme
priorities.100
It is not clear how rural Afghans perceive
their choice of whether or not to migrate.
Some observers see the decision to migrate
99 Lautze, et al., op cit.
100 Kerr-Wilson and Pain, op cit.
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as usually being an act of total desperation,
which should not be portrayed as a choice.
Others point to the clear preference of many
returning refugees for urban resettlement as
evidence that rural livelihoods are perceived
as being less desirable.101
It is very difficult to get an overview of the
extent to which migrant remittances have
supported different rural livelihood strategies.
Estimates of the scale and use of remittances
vary enormously. They are said to account
for up to US$1 billion annually.102 There is
no reliable data on the use of these assets,
but they appear to be primarily used for
subsistence. Returning refugees are also
usually reported to use their savings for
consumption during their period of
reintegration and only rarely for direct
investment in production.
Even among those agencies and observers
who recognise the importance of migration
for rural livelihoods, there are few plans
developed by which to support these efforts.
There are some mentions of the need for
skills training for migration,103 and other
suggestions of investment in post and
te lecommunicat ions  to  fac i l i ta te
remittance.104 Others have pointed out that
the informal mechanisms, such as Hawala,
actually support migration quite well, and
that encouraging formalisation in order to
prevent uncontrolled international financial
transfers (as was done in Somalia) could
severely damage this important livelihood
strategy.105
101 Jamal, A., and Stigter, E. “Real-time evaluation of UNHCR’s response to the Afghanistan Emergency.” Bulletin 3. 31 May
2002.
102 Pain and Goodhand, op cit.
103 Kerr-Wilson and Pain, op cit.
104 Semple, op cit.
105 Maimbo, op cit.
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The previous chapter highlighted the
strategies employed by rural Afghans in
creating their livelihoods. This chapter looks
closer at how programming relates to
livelihoods, particularly how issues of risk,
diversification and transaction costs have
been addressed. These factors are particularly
important to analyse in order to enhance the
impact of agricultural programming on the
decisions made by farmers and rural people
in general.
Impact assessment: fallen by the
wayside?
There is surprisingly little concerted effort
to assess the impact of programming
interventions on the relationship between
agriculture and livelihoods.106 This can best
be attributed to pressures in the aid system
to demonstrate “efficiency” in moving
resources to beneficiaries, rather than looking
at the outcome of these resource transfers.
Agencies continue to do what they see
themselves as being good at, in most cases
seed distribution. Other entry points into
rural livelihood support are far hazier and
are therefore seen as more difficult to fund,
staff, organise and implement, even if the
prospects for impact may be greater.
Analytical rigour in assessing impact appears
to conflict with procedures for expeditious
implementation of projects intended to
achieve quick impacts. Infrastructure is
constructed and rehabilitated without looking
at by whom, how or even if the roads and
canals are subsequently used. Demonstration
farms are established, without significant
4.  The Relevance of Agricultural Programming to
4.  Livelihoods
efforts to ensure that farmers visit and learn
from them, or to see if the technologies being
promoted have actually been adopted.
Thousands of revolving funds are created,
with virtually no ex post evaluation of whether
they have actually revolved. This failure to
learn encompasses seemingly obvious direct
impacts on production and consumption, as
well as equally important indirect impacts
on labour markets. Some agencies are
beginning to recognise this gap107 and a few
detailed surveys are being conducted of the
impact of aid,108 but pipeline pressures and
the general rut of just implementing projects
act as continuing disincentives to closer
analysis. Assessment of impact almost
inevitably raises questions that demand
programme modifications, which in turn may
delay disbursement and disrupt long
established procedures.
A major reason for the lack of analysis of the
impact on livelihoods is the prevailing implicit
assumption that production increase has a
direct and positive impact on well-being.109
Internationally, studies of livelihoods have
shown that this is not necessarily true,
particularly where local, entrenched power
structures have traditionally found ways of
gaining control of surpluses. Entitlements,
rather than production, govern relative well-
being.110 Studies of opium production have
shown that many poppy producers are not
obtaining signif icant profits ( i.e.,
entitlements) from this ostensibly lucrative
crop,111 but there has been no similar analysis
of the link between production and
entitlements in other types of farming.
106 See Pain, 2002, op cit.
107 Reddick, M. Evaluation of Oxfam Hazarajat Integrated Rural Development Programme, Final Report, July-August 2003.
2003; Solidarites, 2003, op cit.
108 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). “Results of the Evaluation of the Autumn 2002 FAO Emergency
Agricultural Inputs Distribution Programme.” FAO Activities Update in Afghanistan No. 4. December 2002.
109 Pain, 2002, op cit.
110 Sen, A. Development as Freedom. New York: Alfred Knopf. 1999; Sen, A. Poverty and Famines. Delhi: Oxford University
Press. 1981.
111 Mansfield, 2002, op cit.
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117 Alden Wily, op cit.
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In a period where rehabilitation is in focus,
a key question related to impact on chosen
target groups is that of who controls the
infrastructure that is being rehabilitated,
especially irrigation. An understanding of the
impact on downstream areas of increased
upstream irrigation off-take and use of
agrochemicals is essential to mitigating
potential negative impacts, but the narrow
project/community focus of most aid
interventions discourages such analysis. Access
to irrigation water is in many cases dependent
on ties to local political or military leaders.
There are also instances where national-level
politicians and commanders have gained
control over such infrastructure. The capacity
of aid agencies to investigate prevailing power
structures is usually weak. Even if they are
aware of how these structures affect access
to water resources, they may have little
capacity to pressure for equitable distribution
of benefits at the community level or to enter
into the multifarious realm of social and
political processes by which access to
resources is negotiated.
Box 4: Land tenure
Landlessness is of course a critical factor in the link between agriculture and livelihoods, but is virtually
invisible in most plans and reports. One study of Bamyan estimates that over half of the rural population
are landless or near landless,112 but the implications of this factor are very rarely taken into account in
the many programmes in the area. An important starting point in assessing impact is to see how programming
decisions are informed by issues related to land tenure, as this is one of the most important determinants
of who benefits from agricultural interventions and how. If the objective of seed distributions, for example,
is to promote use of improved technology, it is essential to first determine who chooses the technologies
to be used on a given plot of land, be it the land owner, sharecropper or labourer. It is equally important
to take into account who will benefit from eventual increased production and who bears the risks if the new
technology fails. Most agencies promoting technology transfer have not analysed these factors.113 In general,
land owners make most decisions, retain most of the profits and bear part of the risk.114 There are some
exceptions to these arrangements. Household vegetable production is not shared with the landlord and as
such is a form of programming that may even benefit the landless.
The long-term strengthening of agriculturally based livelihoods is reliant on a readiness to invest in long-
term land husbandry, for which land tenure is a major determinant factor. Little analysis has been done in
Afghanistan regarding how decisions are made, whether to invest in environmental protection and enhance
soil fertility among landlords, tenants or sharecroppers respectively. Agency staff rely heavily on their pre-
existing beliefs about this issue, rather than on empirical analysis. Evidence suggests that tenants and
sharecroppers move frequently,115 which would make it unlikely that they would be interested in production
systems that protect or improve soils. Terracing, for example, has not proven popular and could only be
expected to be of interest among those who farm their own land.
Range management aspects of land tenure have particularly strong direct impact on both conflicts and
environmental sustainability.116 Vast tracts of land in Afghanistan are sometimes used for extensive grazing
and sometimes for rain-fed cropping when rains are sufficient.117 These lands are also often used for
collection of trees, shrubs and grasses for household fuel. Tensions are great between these different forms
of resource use (and resource users). Environmental destruction due to ploughing appears to be rapidly
increasing in some areas due to improved rains and efforts to gain control of these lands by demonstrating
that the land is under cultivation.118 Issues such as these cannot be addressed through short-term projects.
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Dealing with programming labels
The difference between humanitarian and
development programming in Afghanistan is,
in the eyes of most of those working in the
agriculture sector, a matter of donor funding
modalities and priorities, rather than the
nature of beneficiary needs or operational
contexts. One NGO representative commented
on the frustrations of being offered long-
term “development” funding in a southern
province where insecurity made development
approaches impossible, while the same donor
was only willing to provide short-term
emergency assistance to a very peaceful
province in the north, since it was a lower
priority. The difference between these two
types of programmes is not necessarily related
to the terms of payment upon which inputs
are provided, either. Most observers believe
that agricultural production will need to
receive a significant level of subsidies for
the foreseeable future if vulnerable farmers
are to be able to survive and rebuild their
assets. The choice of whether or not to label
such subsidies as humanitarian has more to
do with which label best ensures access to
funding windows, rather than with the nature
of support given. Perhaps for this reason, the
term “emergency” is more commonly used
than humanitarian to refer to programmes
that are funded with
short-term sources.
Some emergency
p r o g r a m m i n g
therefore consists of
projects that the
implementing agency
would like to use for development purposes,
but where short-term funding is used since
it is the only resource available. Other
emergency programmes do not claim to have
grand, developmental objectives, but are
instead primarily intended just to “capture
the next harvest,” to use the FAO
119 There are also many emergency interventions that have significant indirect intended impacts on agriculture, most notably
infrastructure and food aid.
terminology. The majority of these efforts
that are directly focused on agricultural
production119 consist of seed and fertiliser
distributions. This latter type of emergency
programming is a contentious topic for many
implementing NGOs. Some common criticisms
are:
• Emergency programming is seen to be
too big and too rushed, leading to low
agency expectations regarding impact
and a feeling that “we have to do it, but
really would prefer to go back to
development activities.”
• It is now readily acknowledged that seeds
are available and that emergency
modalities of heavily subsidised
distributions may have unnecessarily
disrupted developmental modalities
designed to gradually establish a
financially sustainable seed industry.
• Given time and quantity pressures,
agencies have little capacity to ensure
that emergency agricultural programming
really reaches the poor and vulnerable.
Some openly acknowledge that their own
targeting “is a joke.”
• There are many examples of how intra-
agency agreements regarding cost
recovery, beneficiary selection or wage
rates have been ignored when one agency
or another either
fai led to act in
accordance with
agreed procedures,
when a donor placed
undue pressure to
distribute a certain
commodity (e.g.,
imported seed) or a new agency appeared
in a district to conduct a “hit and run”
distribution.
NGOs have many stories about the poor quality
of emergency programming among their
“competitors” and some even engage in self-
Most observers believe that agricultural
production will need to receive a significant
level of subsidies for the foreseeable future
if vulnerable farmers are to be able to
survive and rebuild their assets.
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criticism. There is a general sense that the
realpolitik of the aid system in the past few
years has forced many into scaling up beyond
a level in which quality could be assured.
Confusing signals have been given to
beneficiaries about what services could be
subsidised. There is a clear sense of relief
among many agencies that were under such
pressure that emergency funds are now
becoming scarce and that there is an
opportunity to again return to development
modalities. Some agencies have noted that
changes in the terms and modalities of
cooperation between emergency and
development rules have required significant
investment in communications with villages.
These changes have not been seen by the
beneficiaries/clients of these services (or
even many agency staff) as being related to
the changing levels of livelihood stress that
they have experienced.
Despite these critiques, a shift from
emergency to developmental modalities has
been constrained by organisational culture
(in addition to funding modalities). The
chronic crises of the past quarter century
have resulted in the presence of a large
number of agencies that are accustomed to
humanitarian modalities and with staff that
take “supply-side,” distribution-focused
programming for granted. There are very
strong feelings of solidarity with the
communities in which they work. The
replacement of humanitarian staff with more
development-oriented personnel is resisted
by many long-term expatriates who are
dedicated to the country. This legacy is being
challenged by new interagency competition,
in particular through tendering and sub-
contracting procedures that create internal
pressures for a change of the guard within
those agencies hoping to continue to work
in Afghanistan with post-emergency
programming.
There are three general categories of
developmental programming in the
agricultural sector, all of which relate to the
creation and strengthening of agricultural
services:
• Community development;
• Technology transfer; and
• Market promotion.
Most agricultural staff in Afghanistan have
an agronomic background, with little capacity
or inclination for analysing how agricultural
services could be made sustainable through
these three modalities. Some initiatives visibly
run the danger of displacing or discouraging
private sector investment. Food aid is
frequently criticised for competing with local
markets, but there are also major threats
from heavily subsidised rehabilitation and
development interventions as well. Seed and
fertiliser distributions, veterinary services,
very “soft” credits and other aid interventions
are potentially damaging to the creation of
a market for rural services. Similarly,
promotion of agricultural markets suffers
from weak capacity to understand and design
commercially viable interventions.
Prioritisation of crops and marketing channels
are not well anchored in an understanding
of what might best contribute to pro-poor
growth.
The majority of technology transfer efforts
are based on the verification, demonstration
and distribution of new seed varieties. The
strongest justification for seed distribution
is to improve what are perceived to be
genetically degenerated seed stocks. It is
widely acknowledged (though perhaps not in
all applications for funding) that there is no,
and has been no, absolute lack of seeds.
Community development efforts might be
expected to provide a basis for integrating
initiatives to develop services, markets and
new technologies. Community development,
using participatory and institutional
development methods, should be a way of
raising attention to how farmers perceive
the qualities and relevance of the varieties
that are being released by research
institutions and/or distributed by NGOs. It
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should be a way for them to assess the market
qualities of new products and should provide
a platform for developing relations with
service providers. Performance in all of these
areas appears to be poor. Emergency
modalities have meant that “community
development” primarily refers to integrated
programming through assembling a
standardised and often multisectoral
collection of project components, rather than
a forum for exploring where obstacles to
improved livelihoods may be overcome.
Community planning processes are frequently
a matter of negotiating over the use of
investment budgets or revolving funds with
aid agencies, rather than discussing how to
enhance livelihood opportunities.
Despite the prevalence of short-term funding
horizons, exit strategies for development
programming are vague or non-existent. This
conceptual gap is particularly alarming where
local micro-credit, revolving funds and other
structures are being established that would
seem to require a certain level of presence
over a significant period of time. Oxfam has
been one of the few agencies to take a self-
critical stance on its failure to define how it
will leave.120  The UN hopes that transitional
programming will increasingly assume some
consistency of vision in defining the end state
of programming across the relief and
development  spheres.  Some NGO
representatives privately express concerns
about the negative effects of bypass structures
and projectisation on efforts to work toward
an appropriate end state. Evidence thus far
seems to indicate that the bilateralisation of
aid flows121 and the competitive pressures
of the aid market constrain analysis at
provincial and district levels of how
programming should, or could, contribute to
mutual aims and with that, agreement on
hand-over and exit strategies.
Narratives of vulnerability
“In practice, humanitarian responses to
SCCPIs (situations of chronic conflict and
political instability) have been de-linked
from actual vulnerabilities and have
largely been driven by available donor
resources,  preva i l ing  po l i t ica l
considerations and the traditional
organizing principles of humanitarian
response agencies. Humanitarian agencies
have yet to reconcile the way they do
business with the necessary investments
of time, the compromises of visibility and
the need for effective livelihood
programming that challenge violent or
deeply  imbedded processes  of
exploitation.”122
Particularly in a chronic/post-conflict milieu,
the “vulnerability context” would seem to
be a self-evident cornerstone in how
agricultural policies and programming relate
to livelihoods. In Afghanistan, the vulnerability
context is an ephemeral factor in agricultural
programming and in many cases is absent
altogether. The risks that a given vulnerable
person may face are rarely specified in many
project documents. The causal assumptions
behind how a given intervention is expected
to reduce the vulnerability of rural people
or to mitigate the risks to which they are
exposed are rarely explained. Insufficient
attention is given to identifying what it is
that vulnerable people are vulnerable to.
The risks encountered by a proposed set of
beneficiaries, designated as vulnerable
groups, tend to be left vague. For example,
although ample research emphasises the
central role that indebtedness plays in
increasing vulnerability,123 some major food
security documents fail to mention debt as
a factor in assessing vulnerability.124
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There are reasons for this. When risks such
as chronic conflict, profound indebtedness
or insecure land and resource tenure are left
vague, it becomes easier to imagine that
short-term programming might succeed in
solving the problem. Comprehensive risk and
vulnerability analyses
would expose the
deep  s t ruc tu ra l
n a t u r e  o f  t h e
challenges facing the
landless and destitute
a n d  t h e r e b y
demonstrate the
limits to modest
project interventions. This is not to imply
that these interventions are not without
significant benefit to beneficiaries, but rather
that there is a lack of transparency about
the palliative nature of many projects.
In many documents, the term “vulnerability”
is followed by the word “groups.” The
labelling of vulnerable groups is a device to
link data on shortage of assets to selection
of target beneficiaries and choice of items
to be distributed. The identification of
vulnerable  groups  thus  tends  to
decontextualise poverty and reconstitute the
poor as beneficiaries rather than people
struggling to manage complex livelihoods.
The identification of vulnerable groups is a
necessary step in the process of planning
distributions, but it provides little basis for
identifying suitable livelihood support to
address the risks faced by members of these
groups.
The detachment of the focus on identifying
vulnerable groups from a deeper analysis of
the nature of vulnerability itself has meant
that community development efforts have
failed to address the complexity of rural
poverty. The fixed service packages that
dominate emergency and rehabilitation
programming are an insufficient response to
the needs of many of the intended
beneficiaries. The diverse topography of many
regions, with different microclimates, uneven
market access and the varied impact of the
conflict on specific villages, has meant that
even neighbouring villages may have very
different vulnerability
p r o f i l e s 1 2 5  a n d
therefore require
different packages.
Standard categories
of vulnerable groups,
such as children or
the disabled, say little
about what is either
possible or desired by these groups. The
tendency to classify all women as vulnerable
glosses over the extraordinary diversity in
what agricultural activities women are
allowed to perform in even a small geographic
area.126
Risk
The conceptual gap between pressures to
disburse aid to identified vulnerable
beneficiaries and the need to reduce risk in
order to obtain sustainable impact is
particularly notable with regard to agriculture,
since farmer decision-making is always
directly related to perceptions of risk. A
farmer’s decisions whether or not to try a
new seed variety, increase investment in
fertiliser, travel with one’s herds of sheep
to a distant pasture or merely remain in an
IDP camp are all directly related to how risk
is perceived, and the options at hand with
which that risk can be mitigated. The major
hazards that face rural people pursuing
agriculturally based livelihoods include:
• Climatic variability;
• Livestock disease and pest infestation
(especially locusts);
• Recurrent conflict;
• Uncertain resource tenure;
The identification of vulnerable groups is
a necessary step in the process of planning
distributions, but it provides little basis for
identifying suitable livelihood support to
address the risks faced by members of
these groups.
125 Kerr-Wilson and Pain, op cit.; Alden Wily, op cit.
126 Kerr-Wilson and Pain, op cit.
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• Predatory institutions;
• Unreliable public, private and civil society
provided services; and
• Uncertainty, shortage of information and
weak understanding of regional and
international market trends.
In the international discourse, it is frequently
assumed that high levels of risk, from drought
or conflict, drives farmers back to subsistence
and other low-risk strategies. In Afghanistan
nothing could be further from the truth.
Farmers in Afghanistan are not risk averse.
Perhaps driven by the desperation of massive
debts, they are plunging into opium
production, potatoes and other cash crops.
Poppy production has spread from 18
provinces in 1999 to 28 in 2003, including 31
districts where it was never grown before.130
Uncertainties regarding wheat prices push
farmers away from cereal production, as they
strive to obtain cash to pay off debts
accumulated during the drought. Survival
strategies are risky and market-led, for better
or for worse.
127 FAO, 2003, op cit.
128 FAO sees this perception issue as cause for concern. In-kind reimbursement schemes, for example, are preferred to cash
reimbursements, as the latter give the impression of subsidised sales. It is unclear, however, how farmers perceive the
intended messages and how these affect their expectations regarding the long-term role of the state and aid community
in providing subsidised inputs.
129 It is feared that farmers will return low quality seed to such banks, resulting in decline in seed quality. Existing, traditional
seed exchange systems are seen to be more effective.
130 UNODC/GoA, op cit.
Box 5: Vulnerability and seed programming
Critics of seed programming in Afghanistan complain that targeting “is a joke.” They question the commitment,
the capacity and the conceptual frameworks that are needed in order to reach so-called vulnerable groups.
Despite a major survey conducted by FAO, there is little information available about which households within
a given community receive seeds, who actually benefits from eventual production increases and who is able
to actively participate in the different rotating funds that are said to be established with resources generated
by seed distributions.
Despite a variety of guidelines, there is clearly no consensus or joint understanding regarding if or how
different seed distribution modalities should or could be used to target specific beneficiaries in different
ways. Despite formal agreement on “Guiding Principles Governing the Production, Distribution and Import
of Seed and Planting Material of Field Crops in Afghanistan,”127 field staff are largely unaware of these
guidelines and develop modalities based on their own distribution targets, agency objectives and local
interpretations of FAO’s regulatory framework. Little or no effort is made to assess how beneficiaries
themselves interpret the array of seed banks, in-kind repayment, cash payment and soft credits that are
used in these schemes.128 Villagers are visibly confused by vague plans for seed banks and in-kind repayment
schemes that will be commercialised and used for infrastructure investments. NGO staff are also visibly
confused. FAO seed distribution guidelines specifically rule out the establishment of seed banks,129 but
some NGO schemes clearly seem to consist of seed bank-like mechanisms.
The guiding principles prohibit free distributions, but many suspect that the actual levels of repayment for
seeds distributed is low. Some agencies present elaborate procedures for collecting seed back from farmers
after harvest. Others acknowledge that this rarely actually happens. It is not clear who (if anyone) is legally
responsible for ensuring that loans are repaid. 
The link between seed distributions and land ownership is central to any expectation that seed can support
vulnerable groups. It is unclear whether or not free seed enables sharecroppers to negotiate better agreements
with landlords. It is doubtful that it does, given that with cereal seed only accounts for 6-12 percent of input
costs. Most informants question whether sharecroppers are able to negotiate better terms and assume that
their benefits will only come from increased production due to higher quality seeds.
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131 Asian Development Bank, op cit.
132 FAO, Afghanistan: Survey of the Agricultural Sector, op cit.
Progress is being made in some areas in
bringing natural disaster risk into the policy
arena. Given recent experience, drought is
the most glaring natural hazard in Afghanistan,
but local flooding is also common, as are
sand storms and other hazards. Earthquakes
may have a major indirect impact on
agriculture, since they affect migration
patterns. After the earthquake in Bam, Iran,
a large number of Afghan refugees returned
from Iran.
The need to address predictable seasonal
stress through social protection, rather than
humanitarian mechanisms, has also been
recognised. According to one UN
representative, “The government doesn’t
want to focus on winter as an emergency
every year.” Suggestions have been put forth
that meteorological information, snow surveys
in particular, could help farmers predict how
much irrigation water will be available,
thereby reducing their risk by helping them
to make informed decisions regarding varieties
and use of irrigation.131
There is, however, very little research done
on the effects of floods, frost and other
natural hazards on agriculture. One recent
review of horticultural research notes the
major impact of drought on research station
production, but treats this hazard as an
obstacle for (rather than an important topic
of) research.132 Even where information
about levels of risk to agriculture is widely
available, such as the likelihood of major
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locust attacks, it has been very difficult to
secure resources for establishing a standing
response capacity, resulting in the need to
chase emergency funding at the last minute
when significant damage is already inevitable.
It is particularly notable that in agency plans
and in discussions with officials and agency
staff there is very little mention of conflict
and insecurity as constituting major risks for
agriculture. For example, when asked if
recipients of seed aid could be allowed to
delay or write off repayments, agricultural
officers from some NGOs replied that this
was possible only in the event of illness or
natural disaster. The dangers of theft of
livestock and machinery are also rarely raised
in discussions of development potentials.
This tendency to downplay the risk of conflict
may reflect a combination of factors:
• The view that drought was the main cause
of the rural emergency in recent years;
• A fear of reprisals if plans and reporting
openly describe who is responsible for
violence and human rights abuses;
• A concern that donors might withdraw
support if the uncertainties around actual
risk were openly acknowledged, and that
transparency could make financing
impossible;
• A sense of powerlessness with regard to
minimising risk, which leads to fatalism
about the potential effects of conflict
and a feeling that too much reflection
would merely paralyse recovery efforts;
and
• A realisation that the dynamics driving
local, regional and international conflict
are too complex to integrate into agency
procedures and planning structures.
This last point deserves particular attention.
The links between conflict and rural
development are complex and not as self-
evident as might be expected. The link
between opium production and conflict is
one example. It is undoubtedly true that the
drug economy fuels the conflict, but the
channels and inter-relations between
narcotics and war are not linear. In 2003, for
example, narcotics production declined by
49 percent in Helmand and 23 percent in
Kandahar, where conflict was increasing. It
increased by 55 percent in the peaceful
province of Badakhshan.133
The interplay between natural hazards and
chronic conflict is a topic of notable relevance
for Afghanistan given the high levels of risk
from both. In November 2003, a workshop
on the challenge of addressing natural
disasters amid complex political emergencies
drew on experience from Afghanistan to
highlight ways in which agencies are dealing
with these combined sets of risks.134
Diversification
Diversification has traditionally been seen to
be one of the most effective risk reduction
strategies for farmers throughout the world.
In some cases diversification has proven
effective in coping with chronic vulnerability
by spreading risk. These strategies do not
usually lead to escapes from poverty, but
rather a reduced risk of falling into greater
destitution. For others, often those who are
somewhat wealthier, diversification has
proven effective as a strategy for growth.
This latter type of diversification has less to
do with risk reduction and usually involves
engaging in uncertain or unproven strategies
that may increase risk.
Diversification includes not only employing
a variety of livelihood options within the
household through migration, wage labour
and planting different crops, but also
diversification within the community. For
example, the success of Kuchis has been
133 UNODC/GoA, op cit.
134 Johnson, 2003, op cit.
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related to the resilience of their communities.
De Weijer writes:
“Those [Kuchis] with a more opportunistic
and diversified economy are less likely
to be affected by shocks occurring to
their system. But even on a higher level,
these individuals that own businesses or
agricultural land are better placed to
provide labour opportunities to destitute
Kuchis in times of stress. Therefore, a
community that has a high level of
integration into businesses or agriculture
will have a higher community coping
capacity.”135
Diversification is being promoted in a number
of programmes in Afghanistan, primarily for
increased income. The potential of better
supporting diversification specifically as a
way of reducing risk is a topic that would
seem to deserve further analysis.
The primary diversification strategy by which
Afghan households have attempted to reduce
risk is undoubtedly migration. When conflict,
drought or other hazards affect their homes,
the most effective means of mitigating these
risks is more often than not for all or part of
the family to leave. Despite the squalor in
which many refugees, IDPs and urban migrants
live, for them, migration works. During acute
crises, humanitarian assistance has protected
a modicum of dignity for refugees and some
IDPs. Urban services are essential for
135 de Weijer, op cit., 9.
136 Hultgren, M. Review of Social Safety Nets in the Context of Emergencies and Opportunities for FAO Intervention. 2003.
137 Farrington, J., Slater, R. and Holmes, R. Synergies between Livelihood Protection and Promotion: The Agricultural Case.
London: Overseas Development Institute. 2003.
138 Devereux, S. Social Protection for the Poor: Lessons from Recent International Experience. IDS Working Paper No. 142.
Sussex: Institute for Development Studies. 2002.
139 Ibid.
Box 6: From humanitarian assistance to social protection: an agenda for agriculture?
A significant proportion of the Afghan population faces a structural deficit of assets by which to meet basic
livelihood needs. If the Afghan state is to re-shoulder the responsibility for the basic survival of its citizens
that the international community has borne over the past few decades, an institutionally sustainable safety
net is needed. If it fails to do so, its social contract with its citizens will be profoundly flawed.
Social protection can take on many forms, including employment programmes, pension schemes, insurance
and subsidies on agricultural inputs.136 Reducing risk through social protection and enhancing agricultural
investment are inter-dependent and present opportunities for synergy.137 At the same time, there is a
danger that social protection may “crowd out” informal social insurance mechanisms,138 an issue that
should be of particular concern in Afghanistan, where informal mechanisms have proven to be extraordinarily
resilient and where the eventual role and capacity of the central government is highly uncertain.
MRRD issued a policy paper in 2002 entitled “From Humanitarian Assistance to Social Protection.” The vision
outlined therein has significant implications for how the government and international community may try
to ensure security within rural livelihoods. Such a shift from humanitarian to more stable modalities involves
first a shift of responsibilities from the international community to the government. It will also demand a
shift from providing support to loosely defined sets of beneficiaries, consisting of vulnerable groups and
disaster victims to the use of much more refined targeting tools — a major preoccupation in design of social
protection mechanisms.139 While overall data collection regarding vulnerability is certainly improving
rapidly, the capacity of the government to manage transparent and non-politicised inter-community targeting
at the field level remains limited.
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improving the lives of those moving to the
cities. It is uncertain, however, if there is
much that the aid community can offer to
directly support migration’s impact on rural
households. In other countries, post offices
have been found to be an important part of
strengthening migration’s role in rural social
protection by providing a reliable way of
receiving remittances,141 but in Afghanistan
it is unlikely that formal remittance support
mechanisms will outperform the Hawala
system. There may not be aid-financed
solutions that have much to offer to
significantly enhance how rural people
themselves use migration for risk reduction.
It may be enough to ensure that programming
is more cognisant of the central importance
that migration plays in livelihood strategies
and why and in so doing avoid inappropriate
investments in yeoman farmer models that
Afghans realise hold little potential for safe
and sustainable livelihoods.
Transaction costs and farmers’
priorities
A combination of insecurity, uncertainty,
weak formal institutions and destruction of
physical infrastructure together result in
Afghan farmers, traders and even aid agencies
experiencing extraordinarily high transaction
costs. Indeed, it was largely the public
frustration and anger over the unacceptably
high transaction costs imposed by local
commanders that caused the Taliban to
coalesce in 1994 and which helped sweep
them to power.142
Smith et al. summarise the transaction costs
that farmers and traders face as consisting
of:
• Search costs: the costs of searching out
suppliers or buyers in a particular market
(for inputs, outputs or credit).
For example, MRRD is currently planning how to best implement the National Emergency Employment
Programme (NEEP), a large-scale social fund that is a centre-piece in the proposed shift from humanitarian
assistance to social protection. The primary obstacle to a smooth transition from current food for work,
primarily managed by WFP, to NEEP lies in the vast differences in human and logistical resources available
for these ostensibly similar modalities. WFP is undoubtedly the best equipped agency in Afghanistan in terms
of ability to make things happen in the rural areas. The well intentioned desire to ensure that MRRD’s NEEP
management structures remain lean and sustainable has meant that they possess only a tiny fraction of the
resources of WFP for designing, targeting, managing and monitoring NEEP activities in the field. There is
reason to fear that the quality deficiencies already apparent in many food for work efforts are likely to be
far more severe in NEEP. The expectation is that NEEP will address these capacity gaps through contracting
private sector providers,140 but the capacity of the government to act as a smart buyer of such services
has been questioned. The appointment of external oversight agents should support but not absolve the
government of this responsibility.
While there is no doubt about the desirability of ensuring that social protection structures contribute to
agricultural development, weaknesses remain in finding strategies to develop the institutional capacities
that would be required to bridge the two. Lack of capacity to assess viability has meant that income generation
has been largely left out of the first phase of the NSP. Discussion of agriculture’s role in social protection,
and with that the possible transition of agricultural rehabilitation programming into social protections
modalities, has not occurred, since these issues have been the domain of MRRD and not MAAH.
140 MRRD, op cit.
141 Farrington, J., Saxena, N.C., Barton, T. and Nayak, R. “Post Offices, Pensions and Computers: New Options for Combining
Growth and Social Protection in Weakly Integrated Areas.” Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Natural Resources
Perspectives No. 87. June 2003.
142 Pain and Goodhand, op cit.
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• Screening costs: the costs of establishing
the reliability and trustworthiness of
potential parties to a transaction —
particularly the credit worthiness of
borrowers.
• Negotiation costs: the costs of bargaining
with trading partners, or officials
regulating trade.
• Measuring costs: the costs of measuring
the attributes — such as quality and
quantity —  of goods or services being
bought or exchanged.
• Transfer costs: including transport,
processing, packaging and securing title.
• Monitoring costs: the costs of monitoring
whether the terms and conditions agreed
are fulfilled.
• Enforcement costs: the costs of enforcing
agreements, of seeking compensation
when an agreement is broken or the costs
incurred when a contract is broken.143
Farmers ultimately bear the brunt of these
costs, either through higher prices, lower
quality of services they receive or by having
to adapt to a virtual absence of some services.
Diminished trust due to the legacy of conflict,
current insecurity or the capricious nature
of aid flows discourages the emergence of a
sufficient array of service providers to offer
farmers choice. For this reason, market forces
are unlikely to create competitive pressures
to bring down these costs. Weak public sector
institutions and the remaining power of local
commanders make attempts to use legal
mechanisms to hold service providers to
account nearly impossible. Afghanistan’s
mountainous topography, low literacy levels
and lack of communications infrastructure
hinder the flow of information that is essential
for farmers to compare costs and monitor
production prices. Interviews with farmers
show that they are furious over the
inconsistent reliability of inputs that they
receive from the private sector and NGOs.
In turn, the failure of the private sector to
invest in added value in commodity chains
stems from high transaction costs in doing
so. It is important to stress that, with some
notable exceptions, there is usually some
form of service available to meet farmers’
demands. The problems usually relate to
trust, quality, reliability and efficiency.
Input provision is perhaps the most glaring
area of concern for farmers. Fertilisers,
pesticides, seeds and veterinary medicines
are widely available in markets. Farmers in
isolated areas experience high costs in
transporting inputs. Others are primarily
concerned about the low quality of inputs
and their inability to obtain redress when
they perceive that the inputs they have
purchased were fake. Similar complaints are
expressed about poor quality seed provided
by NGOs, particularly the “hit and run”
distributions of the emergency phase. Farmer
interest in extension partly derives from a
need for help in choosing appropriate inputs
from the market, and also a hope that the
state will reassume a role in providing
standardised and subsidised inputs. The
government has presumably never been
strongly accountable to farmers, but is
considered the lesser of two evils. Provincial
and district agricultural staff recognise the
importance of monitoring and regulating
private sector and NGO input provision, but
they have no capacity at all to perform such
tasks.
Finance and credit is a service with high
transaction costs, where aid programming is
trying to replace what are perceived as
exploitive and inefficient informal sector
services. Since interest is formally prohibited
in Islam, informal credit is a sensitive topic.
The quality of services provided informally
varies greatly and is intertwined with wider
patron-client relationships. Interest may or
143 Smith, et al., op cit., 404.
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may not be charged, with patrons reaping
profits through other aspects of their
relationships with clients, such as payment
for crops. Microfinance efforts are expanding
rapidly, driven partly by the desire to provide
an alternative to traditional systems of credit
whereby farmers are locked into poppy
production in order to access loans. Aid
programming varies from extremely soft
credits from NGOs at farm level (often
disguised free distributions) to the recent
licensing of First MicroFinance Bank,
supported by the Aga Khan Fund for Economic
Development. In the long run, microfinance
has the potential to have significant impact.
In the short run, rural Afghanistan is unlikely
to experience a microfinance revolution due
to the high costs of establishing institutional
infrastructure in the countryside.
Successful service provision structures are
characterised by integration. Wealthy farmers
may be able to scan the market and choose
the different services that they prefer, and
due to their buying power they may even be
able to hold service providers to account.
Poorer farmers lack the connections, time
and capital to attract and combine services.
They therefore suffer from far higher relative
transaction costs. This is one reason why they
are particularly attracted to informal
interlocked systems of extension, finance,
marketing and input provision, such as that
frequently provided by traders for poppy
production.
The majority of the aid community still takes
a piecemeal approach to service provision,
but there are notable exceptions. USAID and
some other agencies are starting to invest in
“value chain” or “commodity chain”
initiatives, bringing together producers,
traders, processors and other service providers
involved in the development of commercial
products. By looking at the entire chain
related to a given commodity it is hoped that
bottlenecks that result in prohibitive
transaction costs can be identified and
addressed. One of the first hurdles that must
be overcome in such an approach is to find
a way of creating greater trust among these
different actors. International experience
with investing in commodity chains has shown
considerable success in stimulating economic
development, but in many cases has also
highlighted the inability of poorer farmers
to attain the rapidly rising standards of
quality, quantity and timeliness of production
that commercial markets demand. The actors
in the commodity chain must trust that their
erstwhile colleagues will fulfil their
commitments and they often doubt the
capacity of poor farmers to do so.
Patron-client relations and
contract farming
Poor farmers throughout the world generally
recognise that their best chance of accessing
reliable services is to ally themselves with
patrons who either can provide services
directly or who have the political, economic
and social relations to arrange services from
others. The cost of entering into these
relationships may be high and even exploitive,
but a near destitute farmer usually looks first
at what is left for the family to survive on,
rather than the cost.144 Various studies have
pointed out that access to credit is highly
dependent on ties to patrons.145 Even other
services, such as ploughing,146 are easier to
access where strong ties to a patron exist.
There is a tendency within the aid community
to see sharecropping and other patron-client
relationships as purely a source of
exploitation, as certainly it is. One study
points out that “not a single landlord was
praised as being kind, generous or fair, and
the farmers do not expect them to be.”147
144 Scott, J.C. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University
Press. 1976.
145 Mansfield, 2001, op cit.; Alden Wily, op cit.
146 Allen, op cit.
147 Alden Wily, op cit., 67.
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The massive profits that are made through
the interlocking of services related to opium
production are the most glaring example of
how poor farmers become trapped in cycles
of increasing debt bondage and destitution.
While certainly often extractive, patron-
client relationships are currently the most
viable way that many farmers seek to lower
(or at least stabilise) their transaction costs.
They are the lesser of evils that poor farmers
face. In commercially integrated areas where
competition does exist for attracting clients,
the interlocking of service provision has the
potential of bringing down transaction costs.
It is in the interest of
the  patron,  for
example, to ensure
that inputs are of high
quality and that
farmgate prices are
high when profits are
d i v i d e d  w i t h
sharecroppers. Landlords are in many ways
more accountable to their tenants for the
quality of seed that they provide than aid
agencies whose presence is dependent on
short-term contracts. The competition
between (and accountability of) landlords
may even be growing as increasing wages
make migrant labour a more attractive
livelihood strategy relative to sharecropping.
The revolutionary reforms that were
introduced during 1978-79 were intended to
break patron-client ties and replace them
with more modern agricultural services. The
result was catastrophic. Former institutional
ties were disrupted, while new structures
failed to fill the resulting gap. Given the
limited reach of current agricultural
rehabilitation and development programming,
attempts to replace these relationships with
greater independence may not be feasible
or desirable now either. Dependence on an
exploitive landlord has clear advantages over
dependence on an NGO with a six-month
contract or a government with virtually no
capacity to cover its recurrent costs.
Replacing an exploitive but functioning social
system with one that relies on institutions
not yet created is a high-risk strategy, and
it is rural Afghans that will bear such risks.
This does not necessarily imply that the status
quo should be accepted or reinforced.
Opportunities may exist to at least partially
shift the power balance. Internationally,
contract farming is increasingly being
recognised as a way of reducing risk and
uncertainties by establishing a transparent
d iv i s ion  o f  r i sk
between the farmer,
w h o  a s s u m e s
production risks, and
the investor, who
assumes marketing
risks and ensures
access to inputs.148
Fully commercial contract farming schemes
are very rare in Afghanistan, with an initiative
to restart raisin exports managed by the
Central Asia Development Group being a
notable exception.149
FAO has extensive experience in contract
farming in Afghanistan through seed
production schemes, albeit with significant
subsidies. Learning from this experience
would seem to hold promise as a channel for
incremental reduction of transaction costs
and promotion of a modestly more just and
transparent system of patron-client ties.
Furthermore, a contract farming system would
fit well with the commodity approaches
mentioned above by providing a channel for
private investment in extension and other
services. This will be essential for ensuring
the quality, quantity and timeliness of
agricultural production that will be required
if Afghanistan is to recapture a significant
148 Baumann, P. Equity and Efficiency in Contract Farming Schemes: The Experience of Agricultural Tree Crops. Overseas
Development Institute (ODI) Working Paper 139. London: ODI. 2000; Simmons, P. Overview of Smallholder Contract Farming
in Developing Countries. Food and Agriculture Organisation. 2003.
149 Central Asia Development Group (CADG). Central Asia Development Group: Afghanistan Overview. Singapore: CADG. 2003.
Replacing an exploitive but functioning
social system with one that relies on
institutions not yet created is a high-risk
strategy, and it is rural Afghans that will
bear such risks.
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share of former export markets. It would be
important, however, to closely assess the
prospects for gradually “weaning” any
contract farming system away from subsidised
and guaranteed procurement. FAO’s
experience has shown that such subsidies are
effective in establishing a contracting
framework, but efforts have only recently
begun in moving toward establishment of a
commercially viable seed industry. It is not
certain that they will succeed.
It should be stressed that, although contract
farming may reduce transaction costs so that
some small producers may be able to retain
their involvement in a future seed industry,
most of the very small and undercapitalised
producers will not manage to compete. As
mentioned above regarding commodity chains,
the development of trust and market-based
relations will probably result in the exclusion
of some of the most vulnerable producers.
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While the previous chapter looked specifically
at how risk, diversification and transaction
costs affect livelihoods programming, this
chapter examines how technology transfer
efforts and service provision have (and have
not) contributed to broadening livelihood
options. If farmers are to gain more control
over the services that they receive, it is
important to take into account the historical
trajectories of the modernisation efforts of
the Afghan state and how this has influenced
the identity of extension agents and local
officials. This is contrasted with the narratives
of international policy reform, which
emphasise the role of the private sector and
civil society. While these non-state actors
are indeed essential components of any
enhanced structure for technological change
and rural development, realism and greater
150 Cullather, op cit.
consistency of vision are imperative if project
models are to better relate to prevailing
livelihood choices.
Technology transfer: historical
narratives and current practice
With the exception of the Taliban regime,
modernisation, in the form of introduction
of new technological innovations, has been
a cornerstone of the legitimacy of the Afghan
central government since Nadir Shah assumed
power in Kabul in 1929.150 The transfer of
technology to the hinterlands has been a
raison d’être for the bureaucracy and for
other members of the educated elite who
now staff the aid organisations that provide
agricultural services. They were educated
5.  Broadening Livelihood Options
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with the intention of building a cadre to
implement the green revolution of high
yielding varieties and heavy use of commercial
seeds, pesticides and fertilisers. In
Afghanistan, as in most of the world, the
modernisation ethic is founded upon
narratives of the need to entice (or
occasionally even force) a tradition-bound,
risk averse peasantry to adopt new, efficient,
effective and profitable technologies.
As noted previously, the narrative of the risk-
averse peasant in Afghanistan is false.
Examples of dynamism in agricultural
innovation over the past decade (i.e., in the
midst of conflict and crisis) include a
widespread shift to planting of winter wheat,
massive adoption of new varieties, rapid
increase in potato production (which in
rotation with wheat
d e c r e a s e s  t h e
prevalence of disease)
a n d  t h e  r a p i d
expansion of opium
into new areas.
Afghan farmers are themselves struggling to
access new technologies. The key questions
about this process relate to the terms by
which they interact with sources of new
information and access inputs.
This readiness to adopt new technologies
despite a high degree of risk is not necessarily
related to a search for the most profitable
production strategy. Desperation clearly
drives technological change among some of
the most vulnerable farmers. Various
international studies have noted that
diversification is often motivated by a
realisation that former livelihood strategies
(and technologies) can no longer guarantee
survival.151 If a low yielding wheat variety
means starvation, then the risk of trying a
new, unproven variety becomes acceptable.
The so-called “early adopters” that extension
is traditionally expected to seek out may in
151 Farrington, et al., op cit.; Bryceson, op cit.
152 Remington, T., Walsh, S., Charles, E., Maroko, J. and Omanga, P. “Getting off the Seeds and Tools Treadmill with CRS Seed
Vouchers and Fairs.” Disasters. 2002. 26(4): 316-328.
Afghanistan actually be those who have little
left to lose. It is culturally accepted that
widows and destitute older women, for
example, are able to engage directly in
agricultural activities since they have no
other choice. They may be ready to try new
technologies that more secure women would
not.
Seed distributions as a vehicle for
technology transfer
The main arena in which technology transfer
efforts are underway in Afghanistan is through
the ubiquitous seed distributions. In addition
to providing a subsidy, virtually all seed
programming has been intended to increase
access to improved seed and speed genetic
renewal. The success
in this objective has
been exceptional. In
some areas, agency
staff proudly declare
that local varieties
have disappeared
entirely, a tendency that is disturbing for
those who see a value in retaining
Afghanistan’s extraordinary and unique
genetic diversity.
The success of seed distribution-driven
technology transfer does not automatically
imply that seed has even been declared to
be the most appropriate response. Even where
far broader needs have been identified in
surveys and feasibility studies, seed is the
bulk of what farmers get. This appears to be
due to the legacy of humanitarian and early
rehabilitation programming, where seed was
perceived to be the only feasible form of
intervention. It also is a reaction to the
institutional weaknesses that have made
other types of activities difficult to establish.
It may also be the result of the inertia of the
“seeds and tools treadmill,”152 as the aid
The so-called “early adopters” that
extension is traditionally expected to seek
out in Afghanistan may actually be those
who have little left to lose.
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community is used to seeing seed distributions
simply as what one does in response to a
rural agriculture-related emergency. None
of the seed-related programmes reviewed
were justified based on objectives of
addressing seed shortage per se, i.e., the
default assumption that governs much
international agricultural rehabilitation
programming.
Seed distributions are, to a large part,
conceptualised as ways to push new
technologies on ignorant farmers. Some
agencies specifically target farmers who
commit to following instructions from
extension. This naturally filters out farmers
who do not have the resources with which
to follow extension advice or who do not
believe extension advice to be relevant to
their conditions. Adaptive trials and learning
methods (such as farmer field schools) are
rare. Agricultural officers from most agencies
interviewed stress the primary importance
of changing the attitudes of villagers. It is
thus the behaviour of the villagers, rather
than the conditions in which they survive,
that are seen to constrain livelihoods. One
agency reports using a “yield gap” approach,
i.e., looking for ways to ensure that farmers
can reduce the gap between on-farm and on-
station results with a given variety. Such
approaches have been largely discredited
internationally for their failure to take into
account on-farm realities and for a failure
to acknowledge that maximum yields may
not be optimally profitable for producers
who have little chance of replicating highly
controlled environmental conditions. Many
households also pursue livelihood strategies
153 One evaluation observes, “However, there is a strong impression that the technical components of the agriculture sector
take priority over the social or participatory elements. Much of the extension programme is handled as an issue of technical
delivery rather than as a process of developing farmers’ knowledge and motivation. The seed programme specifically targets
what are called ‘progressive’ or ‘pioneer’ farmers. On-farm trials are described in the strategy as participatory technology
development processes. However, they appear to only systematically record and report biological yield. There is very limited
documentation of the criteria that farmers might use to evaluate trials. Most of the on-farm trials focus either on new
variety introductions or classic agronomist management concerns (seed rates, fertility levels). No evidence of systematic
analysis of farmers’ practices or their management decisions was found. The extension programme bears all the signs of
being designed by extension workers to provide what they think farmers need to know.” (Kampenaar, et al., op cit.,17)
154 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). FAO National Livestock Census 2003, Interim Report. 2003.
155 One frustrated consultant writes: “A tiny fenced ‘demonstration’ of grazing methods (a few square metres) subdivided into
three plots has been installed. This is totally unrealistic and makes the project look ridiculous. A similar travesty of a
demonstration is at Saleb. It would, unfortunately, be difficult to remove them without losing face.” (Suttie, op cit., 11)
that stress other priorities than yield
maximisation, such as sending their children
to school rather than applying more labour
to agricultural production.153
One potential technology transfer focus that
has received surprisingly little notice has
been that of livestock production. Crop
production has proven to be remarkably
resilient, suggesting that producers may need
little extra support to ensure access to seed
and rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure.
The effects of the drought on livestock, on
the other hand, are likely to take longer to
overcome,154 and the already very poor
condition of much grazing land suggests that
a return to traditional extensive systems may
not be sustainable. Programming for livestock
production (apart from veterinary services)
has been erratic and at times consisted of
mere symbolic efforts.155
Accountability in technology
transfer
Local varietal trials and demonstrations are
few and far between in Afghanistan. This
stems from the near collapse of national
research capacity and a tendency to give
higher priority to input distribution rather
than ensuring that seeds are appropriate for
local conditions. Many proposals and plans
call for widespread use of trials, tied to
extension activities, but when compared to
the massive provision of inputs, there is little
evidence of matching activities on the ground
to help farmers assess and learn about the
new varieties that they are receiving. The
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concentration on input distribution has
drained limited human resources from needed
extension activities.165
156 Asian Development Bank, op cit.
157 Allen, op cit.
158 Tunwar, N.S. End of Assignment Report. Kabul: Food and Agriculture Organisation. 2003.
159 Allen, op cit.
160 Barrand, J. “Empowering Women, Fighting Poppy: Red Gold Rising.” The Crosslines Afghan Monitor. 15 July 2003. 1:10-
11.
161 Allen, op cit.
162 FAO, Afghanistan: Survey of the Horticultural Sector, op cit.
163 Ibid.
164 DACAAR. Feasibility Study – Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Sector: Khwaja Omari IAD Project Area, March
2002. Peshawar: Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees. 2002.
165 Solidarités, 2003, op cit.
The ethics of introducing new varieties in
lieu of a considerable level of on-farm trials
and demonstrations deserves critical
Box 7: The mantra of high value – low volume crops
The massive logistical challenges of moving crops to market in Afghanistan and the low profitability of cereals
have inspired many to stress the need to focus on “high value–low volume” crops, an objective that is even
enshrined in the NDF. This interest has been spurred by the need to compete with incentives for opium
production as the pre-eminent high value-low volume crop. Success in developing such crops thus far has
been relatively limited.  Interest in high value–low volume crops is nonetheless strong, particularly as the
investment in improving the efficiency of existing irrigation systems will only yield a positive return if water
charges increase to the point that low value crops (especially wheat) are replaced by high value horticultural
products.156
Efforts have primarily focused on reviving existing horticultural production. Afghan pistachios have a large
and secure market in India, which has been maintained during the conflict, even though production has
shrunk due to destruction of trees and the effects of the drought. Traditional high value-low volume crops
that were sold on the wider international market include raisins, dried apricots, dates, figs and almonds.
Smaller niche crops include black cumin, melon seeds and liquorice root.157 Alongside its large-scale seed
programme, FAO has arranged importation of hybrid silkworm eggs from a variety of countries in an effort
to revive the traditional silk industry in western and northern Afghanistan.158 It has also been suggested
that olive production could be revived, building on a formerly successful plantation.159 There is considerable
unmet domestic demand for both olives (for medicine and cosmetics) and silk.
There are few entirely new crops being investigated or promoted as yet. One option that has been raised
is to take advantage of the relatively cold winters and warm summers to build an industry of custom seed
production. This, of course, will probably await the establishment of a more solid seed industry to meet
domestic needs. Saffron is a new crop that is being introduced, primarily for women producers in Herat.160
It is not only high value-low volume, but also very labour intensive, thus particularly relevant as a competitor
to poppy production. Another type of niche that has not been given much attention is the possibility of
producing horticultural crops to meet off-season markets and thus attract higher prices. Planting under
plastic tunnels could possibly be used to capture better profits,161 and has begun to be used in Balkh and
Logar Provinces162 and in peri-urban farms near Kabul.
The search for high value-low volume crops can be seen as partly deriving from a desire to find a way to
bypass the broad underlying problem of poor post-harvest and marketing infrastructure. Post-harvest handling
is currently the primary obstacle to re-establishing commercial horticultural production.163 One review
states, “Many farmers often find that they have greater problems after the harvest than before the
harvest.”164 Afghanistan has little chance of regaining a significant share in many of its former markets
for dried fruit and other products without a considerable improvement in quality. Improved post-harvest
handling and processing is essential.
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attention. These changes in farming systems
lead to increased risk, especially where
blanket recommendations are being made in
regions with diverse micro-climates. Farmers
do not know how or where seed has been
tested. Surveys have shown that farmers
appreciate the need for both high seed quality
and access to new varieties.166 They are also
quite vocal in their anger when inappropriate
varieties have been distributed and when
agencies have demonstrated a lack of
capacity/commitment to ensuring that the
seeds distributed are appropriate for their
microclimate and soil conditions.
Several agencies interviewed, on the other
hand, while acknowledging some notable
failures of certain distributed varieties,
maintain that the productivity of farmers’
seed has degenerated to the extent that
virtually anything would be an improvement.
This is seen as particularly important in
isolated valleys, where inbreeding is common
and access to commercial seed sources is
relatively limited. The extent to which seed
has actually degenerated could be disputed.
Extensive FAO surveys have found that 54
percent of wheat is being produced by seeds
that FAO has released in the past ten years.167
Some agencies have engaged in hit and run
seed distributions, by arriving in an area and
making free distributions and then
withdrawing. This totally unaccountable
behaviour is underpinned by technology
transfer ethic. If the scientists are
automatically assumed to know best, follow-
up and downward accountability to farmers
are not required. Even in better programmes,
the limited opportunity for farmers to observe
and consider the appropriateness of the
technologies that they receive before planting
raises attention to the limited accountability
of those providing agricultural support. Most
implementing agencies allocate virtually no
funds for investigating the extent to which
166 FAO, “Results of the Evaluation of the Autumn 2002 FAO Emergency Agricultural Inputs Distribution Programme,” op cit.
167 By comparison, in Punjab, India, the annual seed replacement rate is 8-10 percent per annum, implying that Afghanistan
does not lag dramatically behind one of the most commercialised production systems in Asia.
168 Martens, B., Mummert, U., Murrell, P. and Seabright, P. The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. 2002.
farmers are able to make informed decisions
about the value of seeds they receive. This
does not mean that failures go unnoticed.
Disastrous results from wheat seed that proved
totally infertile and imported seed that proved
unusable in Afghan conditions have been met
with outrage by farmers, local authorities
and FAO. Less dramatic examples of failed
accountability, in the form of inappropriate
vegetable seed and wheat seed that merely
yielded a poor harvest, are also common,
but are more accepted by farmers as part of
the risks of testing new varieties.
If the widespread seed programmes across
Afghanistan are largely intended for induced
technology transfer, this would seem to imply
that extension advice regarding fertiliser
applications, suitability for different soils,
etc. would be more than a useful addition
to distributions. Extension advice would seem
to be a responsibility of those agencies
providing seed, since new varieties often
require changes in planting depth, watering
requirements and fertiliser use. A failure to
provide extension can easily lead to failed
harvests, failed transfer of technology and
failed livelihoods. A point of particular note
with regard to the accountability of
technology transfer efforts is that a “normal”
extension service needs to retain the
confidence of its clients if it is to achieve its
targets in the future. It cannot risk completely
alienating its clients by recommending
inappropriate inputs and then leaving. Aid
agencies are by nature relatively free from
accountability to those that they ostensibly
serve.168 Furthermore, the combination of
technology transfer efforts with investment
in community infrastructure means that
farmers feel themselves to be under pressure
to keep quiet about their dissatisfaction with
the technology that has been transferred to
them to avoid antagonising their NGO patrons
and endangering access to larger investments
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in other sectors. The underlying accountability
of the extension agent is weak in most current
aid-financed programming.
These criticisms relate to the modes of
technology transfer, but not the broader
need for development of a dynamic system
by which farmers can explore and access new
technologies. Current technologies are not
sufficient to sustain the population with
dignity (even when complemented by other
livelihood strategies). There are technological
interventions that could presumably go a long
way to buttressing subsistence and helping
farmers to take advantage of market
opportunities. The question is rather how
technology transfer efforts can be promoted
in an ethical manner that recognises farmers’
rights to know what they are getting involved
in when presented with an improved
technology.
“More research and extension”:
where does it lead?
Afghanistan is frequently said to need “more
research and extension.” In one livelihoods
study, villagers ranked various forms of
extension as their top three priorities for
development interventions.169 Other reports
also emphasise the need for expanded
extension activities.170 These calls for more
extension notwithstanding, it is not always
clear what the ultimate aims of research and
extension activities are meant to be or how
the different modalities on offer might serve
to achieve these aims. Research and extension
are not objectives in and of themselves. Their
values can only be assessed in relation to the
ultimate aims to which they contribute. The
goals of more research and extension are
frequently left vague in current programming,
but seem to focus on combinations of the
following:
169 Semple, op cit.
170 DACAAR, op cit.
• Increased food security through higher
cereal yields;
• Increased income through improved
quality, timeliness and quantitative
production of commercial crops;
• Decreased opium production, through
increased awareness and efficiency of
alternative production options;
• Improvements in the licit national
economy through increased tax revenues
deriving from agricultural exports and/or
national self-reliance; and
• Increased equity by supporting women,
poor people and vulnerable groups to
improve their incomes and financial
independence.
Investment priorities need to be assessed
against these different goals. Depending on
the choice of modalities, some of these
objectives will be achieved, but not others.
For this reason, it is important to avoid
conflating these different aims, by
acknowledging that there are trade-offs to
be made. The trade-offs in extension goals
are generally not transparent due to a failure
to concede that the structures created have
major recurrent cost implications. For
example, the lean, efficient, market-led
types of NPM extension structures suggested
by the NDF may ultimately result in a system
that facilitates national growth. They do not,
however, lend themselves to promotion of
equity goals, as extension for isolated
producers and women is highly staff intensive
and will in most cases yield greatest impact
on household consumption, rather than
market integration. A concentration on
women or the rural poor will achieve
important social goals, but will probably not
yield a positive direct return on investment.
Plans and reports mix and conflate references
to targeting the vulnerable with the need to
work with “progressive” farmers that have
the land, labour and capital to invest in new
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technologies. Target groups are rarely
specified, either regarding their needs or
capacities.
In the past, and to some extent even today,
objectives were envisaged as being best
achieved by deciding what was to be done
and telling the extension agents to do it. The
pre-war extension system was highly vertical
and had no channels for feedback from the
field to headquarters in Kabul. Staff were
frequently assigned non-advisory tasks, such
as the sale and/or distribution of inputs and
implementation of relief and development
171 Kampenaar, et al., op cit., 6.
172 Future Harvest. “Science Consortium Established to Rebuild Afghanistan’s Agriculture.” Available at:
www.futureharvest.org/news/afghanistan.shtml. 2002. The lack of faith in the resilience of Afghan agriculture was not
universal. Tunwar writes that, “Afghanistan can very quickly become self-sufficient in food again…We should not take too
gloomy an approach to the speed at which the country will achieve food security.” (Tunwar, 2002, op cit.)
173 Asian Development Bank, op cit., 4.
174 Favre, Contributions to Food Aid, op cit.; FEWS Net, op cit.
175 FAO, Afghanistan: Survey of the Horticultural Sector, op cit.
176 Khan, op cit.
projects.176 Vertical structures are still
formally in place, with all extension
accountability directed upwards to Kabul.
Informally, it is likely that the staff of district
and provincial departments are in practice
often attentive to local concerns and
opportunities to access project funding. This
is not officially encouraged.
Government extension staff are generally
perceived by outside observers as being
passive. Extension agents themselves
frequently acknowledge that they accomplish
very little due to lack of resources. Currently,
Box 8: Agricultural recovery: Not according to plan?
“The processes of policy formulation and the reconstruction agenda at all levels have largely been driven
by pictures or stories about Afghanistan that do not withstand close scrutiny, e.g., devastated society
and infrastructure.  They deny the importance of regional diversity within Afghanistan, the dynamic
nature of the war economy, household strategies and the persistence of the underlying elements of
conflict. At a pragmatic level the probable recovery of agricultural production this year to an estimated
75 percent of national grain requirements challenges the assumptions of devastated rural infrastructure,
collapse of markets, unavailability of seed, lack of access to farm power, etc. that have been made.
While humanitarian interventions have made their contribution, much has also been achieved by
households without aid support.”171
A typical headline from early 2002 reads “With Group’s [a scientific consortium] Help, Country Could See
Bulk of Food Needs Met within Five Years.”172 A major multi-donor mission in 2002 suggested that “A
realistic medium term target would be to return to 1992 levels of output within five years…”173 Headlines
such as these reflect the prevalence of the crisis narrative that has dominated post-2001 agricultural
development thinking. In 2003, Afghanistan’s cereal production was estimated to be one of the largest ever
recorded.174 Even other crops, such as potatoes and melons, have been extraordinarily successful.
Afghanistan’s agriculture was not expected to recover as rapidly as it has, at least not without massive
external assistance. The importance placed on aid interventions ignored the extraordinary latent dynamism
among Afghanistan’s farmers (combined with favourable climatic conditions).
It is important to note that the resilience of Afghan farmers is something that had already been observed
in the recent past (but apparently quickly forgotten). A strong recovery of agricultural production was made
in the late 1990s under the Taliban, only to be cut short by the drought. Studies show that even the fruit
and nut orchards that are popularly portrayed as having been steadily devastated by the years of conflict
are actually relatively young, with 58 percent having been planted over the past ten years.175 The clearest
conclusion of this experience is that our understanding of resilience is lacking. It is easier to predict losses
than to understand how people pull together and reallocate their different assets to rebound in the wake
of a crisis.
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virtually all project-financed extension is
conducted by NGO staff. Extension includes
a broad variety of activities. One agency has
staff that apply agro-chemicals directly in
farmers’ fields.177 Some extension efforts
have surprisingly limited extension associated
with them. In one long-term programme
visited, several impressive terraced
demonstration farms had been established
at considerable cost. Very few arrangements
had been made, over the years, for farmers
to visit and learn from these farms. The
adoption or diffusion of the technologies
extended are seldom monitored. Apart from
one major FAO survey,178 little investment
has been made in assessing farmers’ reactions
to new proposed technologies and whether
those technologies have proven relevant or
not.
Despite the vision of the NDF for a government
that stays out of direct service delivery
wherever possible, privatisation of extension
services has not been considered by the
government or NGOs. The option of using aid
resources to contract private extension
advisors179 has not been considered. As long
as significant levels of donor
funding are available, there is
a tendency for NGOs to simply
hire more extension agents
t h e m s e l v e s ,  w i t h o u t
consideration of what kind of
agricultural knowledge and
information system could or
should be developed. Extension
in Afghanistan is dominated by
the contracting of services by
NGOs, but these NGOs are not
keen  to  p romote  the
emergence of a competitive
system that provides for
transparency, monitoring, cost
comparison and quality control.
177 Solidarités, 2003, op cit.
178 FAO, “Results of the Evaluation of the Autumn 2002 FAO Emergency Agricultural Inputs Distribution Programme,” op cit.
179 Many NGOs providing extension services could, however, be described as private businesses.
180 See, for example, Neuchâtel Group. Common Framework on Financing Agricultural and Rural Extension. Available at:
www.neuchatelinitiative.net. 2002.
This is not to say that full-fledged
commercialisation and privatisation of
extension services, as is underway in many
countries, is a viable alternative in
Afghanistan. The vast majority of extension
will, for the foreseeable future, need to
remain publicly funded, and the emergence
of private service providers to compete for
service contracts will be a difficult process
and may not happen at all in isolated areas.
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the
current unaccountable, supply-side structures
are the only alternative. Publicly/aid-funded
and privately delivered structures have been
established rapidly in other chronically poor,
post-conflict contexts (e.g., Albania). There
is a wealth of experience with alternative
models180 that has yet to be considered in
Afghanistan.
Relationships between NGOs and the
governmental extension service can be seen
as falling into three categories:
• Integrated: usually where government
staff are fully involved in the work of the
NGO, often to the extent that they are
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effectively “contracted in.”181 Experience
of application of NPM modalities in
extension services has often shown that,
although the initial objective has been
to contract out services, the pre-existing
public sector extension structure remains
in place (albeit with no operational
budget) and a well-staffed private sector
does not automatically appear to take
advantage  o f  the  commerc ia l
opportunities being provided. Instead,
NGOs very often obtain contracts to
provide extension services, which they
in turn implement by contracting in
available government extension agents
in the field. This can even be observed
on a limited scale in the more successful
NGO-government collaboration initiatives
in Afghanistan, where the NGO inevitably
pays incentives to participating public
sector extension staff. through support
to transport, field allowances, salaries,
etc.
• A t t e m p t e d
collaboration, but
failure to achieve
agreement: due
to differences in
priorities, envy
over resources,
and other reasons.
• Non-collaboration: no attempts made to
work with government structures due to
low priority given by the NGO to
institutional development, complete
absence of government extension staff
in the area of operations or other reasons.
The financial sustainability of public extension
services is not a topic for active discussion.
The government realises that it has already
lost its best staff to NGOs due to low salaries,
but the only solution is seen to be more
181 Experience of application of NPM modalities in extension services has often shown that, although the initial objective has
been to contract out services, the pre-existing public sector extension structure remains in place (albeit with no operational
budget) and a well-staffed private sector does not automatically appear to take advantage of the commercial opportunities
being provided. Instead, NGOs very often obtain contracts to provide extension services, which they in turn implement
by contracting in available government extension agents in the field. This can even be observed on a limited scale in the
more successful NGO-government collaboration initiatives in Afghanistan, where the NGO inevitably pays incentives to
participating public sector extension staff.
182 FAO, Afghanistan: Survey of the Horticultural Sector, op cit.
money from Kabul to pay higher salaries and
employ more staff. NGO-run extension
modalities are expensive and virtually no
attention has been given to planning how
such operations could continue when aid
financing is reduced. Some reports
recommend establishing innovative, but
relatively intensive/expensive, extension
methods such as farmer field schools,182
without indicating how recurrent costs will
be financed.
Given the predominance of seed distributions,
it is not surprising that extension is, to a
large extent, an activity that is piggybacked
onto seed programmes. Some agencies see
subsidised seed distributions as a needed
incentive to encourage farmers to follow
extension advice. Farmers are not expected
to pay for advice, but rather are expected
to have to be provided with incentives to
take advice. The underlying patronising
assumption is that
extension is about
raising awareness,
rather than serving
f a r m e r s .  U n t i l
extension services
b e g i n  s e e i n g
themselves as serving
farmers, client-oriented or demand driven
approaches are unlikely to take root among
either NGOs or the government.
Given the need for adaptation, monitoring
and verification of the introduction of any
new technology, quality extension must have
a strong link to research. For the most part,
the research-extension linkage issue in
Afghanistan has been an afterthought and in
many cases has been disregarded entirely.
There are, however, some notable positive
experiences. Through the work of the Future
Until extension services begin seeing
themselves as serving farmers, client-
oriented or demand driven approaches are
unlikely to take root among either NGOs
or the government.
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Harvest Consortium and FAO, Afghanistan
was a model for early investment in re-
establishing a research infrastructure using
emergency funding. With  the International
Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry
Areas (ICARDA) as the main institutional
partner, government research facilities were
rapidly rehabilitated and a modest but
essential structure was created for drawing
attention to the need for verification trials
and other research related to the introduction
of new varieties. These efforts were not
sufficient to completely prevent the import
and distribution of inappropriate seed, but
have been able to ensure that need for
research and verification has not slipped
entirely from the agenda.
The experience with inappropriate seed
imports in recent years has shown that
Afghanistan clearly needs a capacity to screen
new varieties, and it has an agency in place
with renowned expertise in developing such
screening capacity (ICARDA), but after initial
support to research, there has been a
subsequent slump in funding for genuine
research and verification activities. A lack
of consensus among donors and the
government regarding the structure of a
future research and extension system, and
pressures to obtain quick impact have meant
that ICARDA support has become increasingly
skewed toward demonstrations and
establishment of seed production units.
ICARDA’s comparative advantage as a research
institution has been ignored in the search for
implementing partners. Another concern in
the “borrowing” of limited research capacities
to support seed distribution is that it may
distract from the need to channel research
toward crops with good economic potential.
For example, even though smallholder cereal
production is unlikely to prove competitive
in the long term, 71 percent of research station
land is used for cereals, primarily wheat.183
183 Ibid.
184 Byerlee and Alex, op cit.
185 Christoplos, I. Common Framework for Supporting Pro-Poor Extension. Lindau: Neuchâtel Group, LBL. 2003. Available at:
www.neuchatelinitiative.net.
In sum, extension efforts are currently not
sufficiently linked to efforts to understand
the livelihoods of either farmers or even of
the future extension agents themselves.
Internationally, development actors are
increasingly realising that there is no single
correct model for research and extension.
Instead, there is a realisation that a two-
pronged approach may be required to ensure
that potential high-growth options are pursued
in places that are integrated into markets
and low-risk, subsistence support is prioritised
in marginal areas. This dichotomy is valid for
both research184 and extension.185 A central
finding of international reviews is that the
public sector alone cannot finance, let alone
deliver, extension services to meet all
requirements. In many countries, extension
is being privatised in areas well-integrated
into markets. This may result in resources
being shifted to more remote areas where
the majority of rural poor live. In these
remote areas, some states have acknowledged
that subsidies in the form of publicly financed
extension and other support to agricultural
production are justified to prevent forms of
social misery and disruption, which ultimately
have higher financial and human costs than
the cost of the services provided. The more
isolated areas, with very poor infrastructure
(which is characteristic of a large proportion
of Afghanistan), have little access to
commercial markets and also are “protected”
from cheap imports due to the high costs of
transporting imported food to local
consumers. Services for isolated areas may
need to accept an emphasis on subsistence,
leaving the pro-poor growth agenda to areas
with greater prospects for market integration.
Operationalising a two-pronged research and
extension structure, such as this, relies on a
broad vision for the role of the state in
agricultural development that acknowledges
the diversity of needs and resources available
in any given country. It also demands a
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pragmatic acceptance of the need to set
priorities on the use of limited resources,
even if such priorities include cruel choices.
Private sector alternatives to
public sector service provision
Even in areas other than agricultural
extension, support for private sector
development as an alternative to state service
provision is at an early stage. The NGO
thinking that dominates agricultural activities
closely resembles the statist paradigm. Both
are supply-driven and lack a customer
orientation. Neither includes accountability
mechanisms or elements of competition. Few
evaluations, assessments and plans assess
the possible or actual impact of interventions
on private sector development.186 In the
past, the nature of humanitarian assistance
in many ways justified such an approach.
Today, this conceptual gap stands in stark
contrast to the stated aims of the NDF.
Dangers of NGO programming crowding out
private service providers or of overly generous
support to chosen implementing partners
upsetting the establishment of a level playing
field for commercial competition are generally
ignored. Even where the private sector is
given priority, the desire to demonstrate
quick impact encourages the provision of
large and presumably very soft loans to
entrepreneurs who have brought aid providers
into their networks.
Distrust regarding the private sector stems
from the perception that agriculture is the
foundation of rural livelihoods and from fear
(in some ways well justified) of turning over
responsibility to private actors that are poorly
understood and therefore unpredictable. The
strength of the private sector in contributing
t o  p o v e r t y  a l l e v i a t i o n  t h r o u g h
commercialisation and processing services
186 One notable exception is Kampenaar, et al., 2002.
187 See Heierli, U. Poverty Alleviation as a Business: The Market Creation Approach to Development. Berne: Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation. 2000.
188 FAO has a system of field offices, but these have been almost entirely maintained with emergency funding. Their existence
is now threatened due to the phasing out of emergency funding.
must come from seeing the poor as customers
of businesses that endeavour to sell services
such as, for example, drip irrigation systems,
post-harvest storage facilities or transport.187
There is little indication that either the
government or most NGOs have shifted their
views of farmers away from being
beneficiaries of agricultural services to being
potential customers.
Through RAMP, support is being considered
for food processing incubators in order to
support fledgling enterprises. The largest
engagement with the private sector is in seed
production where, despite some setbacks to
the search for a viable market relationship
during the emergency phase, renewed and
serious attention is being paid to redefining
farmers as customers rather than
beneficiaries. Current thinking within FAO
indicates that a commercially viable seed
system will require far more attention to
how to actively market the product and a
realisation that due to small margins between
seed and grain prices, wheat seed is unlikely
to provide a commercially viable base for a
seed enterprise. Higher value products, such
as vegetable seed, must be part of an eventual
marketing strategy. It should be stressed,
however, that although FAO is discussing
these ideas together with their MAAH
counterparts at central levels, seed
enterprises and NGOs continue to set seed
production targets according to government
targets and donor promises of procurement,
with little attention to whether or not farmers
want to buy the seeds produced. The result
has been that only half of the seed produced
by FAO’s implementing partners has been
resold to farmers. A paradigm shift is sorely
needed, but FAO’s capacity of raising the
awareness of its implementing partners to
market realities is shrinking, as FAO’s own
capacity for field level engagement shrinks.188
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Informal discussions reveal a tendency among
many observers to assume that a market
orientation will inevitably lead the private
sector towards (rather than away from) opium
production, as it is the most profitable
business opportunity. The search for
alternatives to the opium economy may
distract attention from dealing with the
reality that the majority of financial flows
in agriculture are in one way or another
linked to the opium trade. This issue in private
sector development may therefore be one of
finding ways to encourage diversification in
the reinvestment of opium profits into other
businesses, rather than framing private sector
development as an either-or proposition.
There are some indications that wealth does
encourage diversification out of poppies. In
Helmand, Afghanistan’s province with the
largest production of opium, poppies are
primarily concentrated in those districts with
small, scattered land holdings, with uncertain
access to irrigation.189 Farmers that can
afford better land have other investment
priorities. Concerns about the country
descending into a narco-mafia state are not
anchored in an understanding of the political
economy of how mafias choose investment
priorities. As their risks increase (as they
hopefully will as the Afghan state becomes
consolidated), these mafias and the farmers
who supply them will most probably make
incremental shifts in their investment
portfolios into other businesses. A major
unanswered question is whether aid can be
used to speed up this process and to influence
their decisions on how to deal with
increasingly risky narcotics production.
In addition to those involved in the opium
economy, Pashtun traders are another group
that has long played a major role in
agr icultural  marketing throughout
Afghanistan. Strengthening and formalisation
189 Mansfield, 2002, op cit.
190 International Crisis Group (ICG). Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation. ICG Asia Report No. 62. Kabul/Brussels:
ICG. 5 August 2003.
191 Ibid. ICG notes that Pashtun businessmen feel particularly insecure in Herat, where Ishmail Khan discriminates against the
Pashtun and exerts tight control over his trading monopoly.
192 Kydd, J. and Dorward, A. “The New Washington Consensus on Poor Country Agriculture: Analysis, Prescription and Gaps: with
particular attention to globalisation and finance for seasonal inputs.” Development Policy Review. 2001; 19(4):467-478.
of the private sector is fundamentally
dependent on how entrepreneurs such as
these judge the prevailing level of security
for themselves and their investments. Due
to fears of retribution and uneven rule of
law in the rural areas, Pashtun traders
currently do not feel secure.190 They pass
on the costs of their insecurity in the form
of higher transaction costs and a vacuum of
rural services in many isolated areas. As long
as local and regional commanders191 can
exercise their power at will to the benefit
of their clans, families and associates, major
reinvestment by the large and wealthy
Pashtun trading diaspora is unlikely.
Redefining the role of the state
The NDF in general and agricultural policy in
particular do not specify what, where and
how the state should intervene in the provision
of public goods. The flip side of any NPM
approach is the importance of determining
where the market is unlikely to invest and
how to ensure that resources (not least the
relatively generous supply of aid money) are
available for these public goods. Kydd and
Dorward point out that the “Washington
Consensus” that has led to the introduction
of NPM policies throughout the world has
failed to provide a coherent basis for
determining how to prioritise investments in
agricultural public goods.192
There are certain areas, particularly with
regard to livestock, where there is no
substitute for state intervention. Many types
of veterinary services have the potential of
being privatised (see Box 9), but the control
of epidemics, ensuring the quality of
medicines and vaccines, quarantine, border
controls and phytosanitary standards are all
public goods. The collapse of such services
has already been felt in Afghanistan. Imports
Issues Paper Series
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)58
of water buffalos from Pakistan for meat
have brought cases of rinderpest.
There are also major issues related to the
environment and natural resource
management that may require state
intervention. One of these is addressing
conflicts between use of range for crops or
livestock. Vast areas of land are used as
pasture during most years, but may be
193 Barker, T.J., and Mehraban, A.B. The Development of Veterinary Services in Afghanistan 1986-2000. Working Paper No.
1/2000. Islamabad: United Nations Development Programme. 2000.
194 Ibid.
195 Italtrend, op cit.
196 Ostrom, K. Self-Sustainability of Veterinary Field Units: Integrated Livestock Programme. Consultancy study for the Food
and Agriculture Organisation. 1997.
197 Reddick, op cit.
198 See International Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship. Meeting Conclusions: International Meeting on Good Humanitarian
Donorship, 16-17 June, 2003, Stockholm. 2003.
199 Italtrend, op cit.; Ostrom, op cit.
200 Johnson, 2000, op cit.; Alden Wily, op cit.; Suttie, op cit.; Semple, op cit.: DACAAR, op cit.
ploughed for crop production when there is
sufficient rainfall. Differing interpretations
of grazing rights and land ownership for these
rain-fed areas are common. Tensions between
pastoral and settled groups have caused both
violent reprisals and contributed to a zero-
sum approach to natural resource
management that has rapidly degraded the
environment.200
Box 9: Veterinary services and ambivalence toward private service provision
Internationally, veterinary services have been a central battleground in the debate over the relevance and
viability of NPM approaches to redefining the role of government in agricultural services. There has been
relatively good success in establishing privately provided and fee-based veterinary services (particularly for
large stock). Extension has been more difficult to privatise and commercialise. Livestock owners, however,
have been found to be among the sectors of the population who are hardest hit by drought and conflict and
therefore in greatest need of subsidised assistance for recovery. Even well performing and relatively sustainable
commercial veterinary services have been hard hit by emergencies. In the past, Afghan veterinary services
were intended to be provided free by government staff. In practice, payment for medicines has always been
common.193 Support to veterinary services during the period of conflict began with a political, rather than
a humanitarian or livelihood agenda. Support was initially targeted to services for the donkeys of the
mujahiddin. Since then, a variety of agencies have supported veterinary services, primarily FAO and the
Dutch Committee for Afghanistan. Although piecemeal, by 1999 the various initiatives were said to amount
to broader coverage than existed in 1979.194 Recently, funding has begun to shrink and with it the level
of coverage. At the same time the array of actors has expanded, with short-term assistance from NGOs,
International Security Assistance Forces and other agencies.195 Legislation is unclear, and proposals for a
new legal framework have been met with similar donor scepticism and debate over statist versus NPM models,
as in other agricultural services.
In the past it was expected that commercialisation would ensure the viability of the myriad of veterinary
field units.196 This has proven over-optimistic. It is important to analyse why these services, that farmers
obviously value, have had such difficulty in establishing a higher degree of cost recovery. The staff of some
agencies have steadfastly resisted plans to increase the independence of veterinary units.197 One of the
main factors that complicates a process of commercialisation is that different agencies dabbling in the
veterinary field have different policies regarding subsidies, salary levels and fees. “Good donorship” in
preventing such tendencies is a scarce commodity.198 Standardisation may be needed as a first step to level
the playing field for more self-reliant veterinary services in the future. This, however, is not enough. In the
opinion of farmers, agricultural officials and the aid community, control of the quality of service provision,
in particular that of medicines and vaccines, is a precondition for developing trust between livestock owners
and private veterinarians.199 The capacity of the state to shoulder regulatory responsibilities must be
developed if the private sector is to flourish.
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The MAAH recognises the seriousness of this
issue,201 but there is as yet no clear strategy
to address it. Most recommended measures
for improving l ivestock and range
management (e.g., through rotational grazing,
stall feeding methods, and a shift from annual
crops to trees) would require consensus and
clarity on rights of access. Participatory and
local watershed management approaches
may have a role to play in negotiating joint
resource management,202 but given prevailing
levels of distrust, a measure of formal
regulatory engagement will almost certainly
be needed as well.203 Experience in
neighbouring countries could provide both
positive and negative examples of how to
deal with these complex issues.204
Civil society in agricultural
development: stimulating demand
Afghanistan has yet to move beyond supply-
driven service provision where government
and NGOs compete for access to donor
resources. The central reason for this is that
farmers, as yet, lack the power to demand
better services. They feel that their situation
is so fragile that acting as a cooperative
beneficiary is the most effective strategy to
get something out of service providers. They
have little experience with accountable
service provision.
Until recently, approaches to stimulating
demand-driven agricultural services often
assumed that a free market could ensure
that farmers get what they want. If individual
farmers were given an opportunity to choose
and buy the services they need, then the
issue of demand would be solved. Analyses
of the powerlessness that accompanies
chronic conflict and poverty have shown that
the miracle of the marketplace rarely shows
up at the doorstep of the poor. Furthermore,
201 Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry (MAAH). Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Natural Resources Management
Sector Consultative Group. Kabul: MAAH. 6 May 2003.
202 Alden Wily, op cit.
203 See, for example, DACAAR, op cit.
204 Kreutzmann, op cit.
the transaction costs that are experienced
by individual farmers who can at best buy a
few kilos of seed or a few sacks of fertiliser
are too great to be overcome by the efficiency
increases that may be found through more
effective markets. Instead, there is a growing
realisation that demand needs to be
stimulated by investing in civil society and
farmer organisations. Only through joint
action can farmers hope to overcome their
lack of power and take advantage of
efficiencies of scale in accessing services.
The aid community in Afghanistan has an
ambivalent approach to investments in
stimulating demand. Virtually no agency
would question the need for stimulating
demand and there are some significant
investments in strengthening the capacity of
organisations that claim to represent
communities and farmers. At the same time,
the supply-driven nature of aid flows has
meant that efforts to build capacity appear
to be more focused on building capacities to
absorb aid, rather than to demand it.
Shuras to the rescue?
The shura is the lynchpin in the visions of
the aid community (and to some extent the
government as well) for the institutional
infrastructure that will support future
agricultural and rural development. It is seen
as the basis for rebuilding what is popularly
assumed to be heavily depleted social capital.
If shuras are to be employed as the solution,
it is first important to critically analyse what
the problems of social capital and community-
level governance actually are, and whether
or not the shuras members are themselves
interested in addressing these problems. It
is also important to consider whether they
might even be part of the problem.
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Current understanding of the narratives about
traditional local organisations that guide
participatory development efforts205 and
humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in
the midst of chronic conflict206 suggest
caution in assuming that organisations such
as shuras might be expected to share (or be
induced to share) the same objectives as the
aid community. These various studies have
shown that the consensuses that are formed
through participatory methods rarely
represent the concerns of the poor or
marginalised. Even otherwise laudatory
reviews of the role of the shuras acknowledge
that “what the agency expects the shura to
do, in the function of a village development
association, is something very different from
what the shura is used to do, what it is set
up to do, and what the community expects
it to do.”207 Furthermore, many agencies
haphazardly load their programme documents
with a mix of managerial and social
engineering objectives. One evaluation
comments:
“The objectives for village organisations
(VOs) … are too many and too diverse, as
they include narrow objectives relating
to programme activities and broad
objectives about empowerment …it is
difficult to know whether DACAAR sees
VOs mainly as the interface between itself
and villages, or as new institutions to
challenge traditional sources of power,
or as both.”208
Due to all of these factors, the sustainability
of shura-based community development must
be questioned. Despite concerted efforts at
205 See Cooke, B., and Kothari, U., Eds. Participation: The New Tyranny. London: Zed. 2001.
206 Grünewald, F. ALNAP Global Study: The Case of Afghanistan. London: Overseas Development Institute. 2003; Harvey, P.
Rehabilitation in Complex Political Emergencies: Is Rebuilding Civil Society the Answer? IDS Working Paper 60. Sussex, UK:
Institute of Development Studies. 1997; Keen, D. The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in
Southwestern Sudan 1983-1989. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1994.
207 Harpviken, K.B., Suleman, M. and Taksdal, M. Strengthening the Self-Reliance of Returnee Communities: The Enjil Community
Development Programme, Herat Province, Afghanistan. Report from an Independent Mid-Term Review for Ockenden Venture.
May 2001.
208 Kampenaar, op cit., 15-16.
209 Reddick, op cit.
210 Johnson, 2003, op cit., 6.
211 Johnson, 2000, op cit., 7.
212 Alden Wily, op cit.
213 See Kanbur, R. Obnoxious Markets. Working Paper 2001-08. Ithaca, New York:  Department of Applied Economics and
Management, Cornell University. July 2001.
214 Pain and Lautze, op cit., 18.
empowerment, extending to over a decade,
an evaluation of one major integrated rural
development programme notes with concern
that not a single shura has “graduated” from
programme support.209 Chris Johnson notes
that “it is unclear what civil society actually
means in the Afghan context.”210 In an earlier
study she found that interviewees in Hazarajat
had lost faith in their own institutions, “Yet
although they wanted a new leadership,
people also spoke of their lack of hope that
it would emerge from within the community.
They pinned their hopes instead on the idea
that it might come from outside.”211 She
points out that a significant degree of
legitimacy remained at the “very local village
level,” but stressed the distrust toward people
with power and guns. Alden Wily has
uncovered similar findings.212
It is possible that some of the social capital
that binds Afghan social relations would be
characterised by much of the aid community
as consisting of “unsocial capital,” i.e.,
market relationships based on the opium
trade and abuse of power.213 The interplay
of social and unsocial capital frames many
of the livelihood choices that face rural
Afghans today. Pain and Lautze write that
“contrary to popular thinking, states do not
fail in times of chronic conflict and political
instability; rather they become conveniently
diffuse, rich in complicated networks that
extend from local strongmen/warlords to the
boardrooms of international firms.”214 Both
social and unsocial capital form the glue that
holds these broader economic and political
networks together.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 61
Out of Step? Agricultural Policy and Afghan Livelihoods
At another level, recent research into the
role of traditional institutions and social
capital has recognised that, while these
institutions are the first (and most reliable)
source of support for the destitute and those
experiencing livelihood shocks, they are also
mechanisms that reinforce structural poverty.
Kothari and Hulme write:
“When poor people in Bangladesh face
problems their first port of call for social
support are these local/informal networks
and not ‘professional’ poverty reduction
agencies. Having said this, there is a need
to shift our focus in contemporary
development policy from an uncritical
valorisation of civil society in order to
recognise that social capital is not always
and inevitably a positive asset, but one
which can also keep poor people poor.”215
This should be especially true where civil
society has as unfettered power as it does in
Afghanistan. There is, however, little
acknowledgement of such ambivalence about
the power of civil society in Afghan rural
development programming. A typical
programme document states: “Participatory
decision-making can empower the
marginalised and develop a community’s
capacity to analyse its environment, identify
and address its problems, and take
responsibility for development.”216 Despite
disturbing evidence and experience of the
abuse of power by warlords, commanders
and village elites, a certain myth of
egalitarianism in Afghan civil society still
remains.
In search of farmers’ organisations
A central question regarding the role of shuras
in supporting agricultural development is the
question of whether they can be considered
215 Kothari, U. and Hulme, D. Narratives, Stories and Tales: Understanding Poverty Dynamics Through Life Histories. Manchester:
Institute for Development Policy and Management. 2003; 13.
216 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). The Development of Sustainable Agricultural Livelihoods
in the Eastern Hazarajat. Project Document GCP/AFG/029/UK. 2003; 13.
217 See, for example, FAO, Afghanistan: Survey of the Horticultural Sector, op cit.
to be, or can be transformed into, farmers’
organisations. Some agencies approach this
issue as inherently unproblematic, relating
to the shuras as if they were by nature capable
of representing farmers and engaging in a
variety of activities related to marketing,
technology transfer, etc. Others invest in
building the capacity of shuras to act as
farmer organisations. Some reports see the
role of shuras as being unrelated to agriculture
and bemoan the complete absence of farmer
organisations capable of engaging in marketing
and other commercial functions.217
At the centre of this issue is the potential of
developing the shuras into genuine producer
organisations, with accountability to members
(rather than to the community as a whole)
and an ability to manage economic
transactions in a competitive market
economy.  This is doubtful within current aid
modalities. There are two reasons for this.
First, prospects for sustainability are poor as
long as aid projects operate as the main
buyer of the produce (as is the case in much
seed production). Many project plans are
vague about how the supporting agency will
eventually withdraw and either be replaced
by market relations with commercial traders
and processors, or by a higher-level farmer
organisational structure that can assume
responsibility for marketing and other tasks.
There are some efforts to work with
intermediate levels (e.g., the creation of
“cluster shuras”), but there is generally little
indication that these organisations are
motivated by a genuine desire to engage in
cooperative economic activities. Furthermore,
mechanisms to ensure financial accountability
to members have not been developed. This
should come as no surprise. The shuras are
ultimately not economically oriented
membership organisations, but rather political
bodies.
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The second problem in treating shuras as if
they were farmer organisations is the
tendency to combine community development
efforts, having primarily social development
aims, with the organisation of producers,
that must be led by commercial and market
prerogatives focusing on the interests of
individual households. Agricultural
development efforts that are channelled
through shuras may be effective in dealing
with some public goods, such as locust control,
but are unlikely to develop into the type of
structures that would be necessary to address
private goods.
The alternative is naturally to pass over the
shuras in efforts to strengthen farmer
organisation. There are some efforts in the
area that are said to be quite successful,
e.g., FAO support to dairy collection in Mazar-
i-Sharif.218 Other structures are being
established with the primary aim of linking
to groups of farmers for the provision of
micro-finance services, for example by CFA
in Kunduz, where demobilised former
combatants are being organised accordingly.
As mentioned earlier, the government hopes
to channel such interests into rebuilding
cooperative structures. There is widespread
distrust by donors (and perhaps by farmers
as well) that such cooperatives will be more
accountable to the government than to their
members. Intentions to use these cooperatives
as channels for subsidised services (as was
past practice) suggest that these fears are
warranted.
It is especially unclear how issues that
combine the management of access to public
and private goods, such as irrigation, can be
addressed in an effective manner. One multi-
donor mission recommended that river basins
and sub-basins be used as the main unit for
planning and management.219 But it remains
to be seen if such a watershed approach is
viable and appropriate given the power
structures that frequently dominate such
areas. Weakly or inequitably led watershed
management structures could instead fan
existing upstream-downstream animosities.
There is widespread faith that traditional
(mirab) water management institutions can
address potential conflicts in current irrigation
system renovation, but there is little
knowledge about how the years of conflict
have impacted upon these traditional
arrangements. It is relatively easy for
commanders to ignore downstream users.220
The lack of agency capacity to monitor these
issues gives cause for concern.
Despite these dangers of investment in less-
than-civil society, there is no viable
alternative other than working with local
institutions. If an appropriate relationship to
civil society is to emerge, it will only appear
once agencies start shifting some of their
power to their community partners. Among
the NGOs there is little explicit discussion of
the need on their part to be accountable to
local civil society. Anchored in a technology
transfer mode, they generally perceive
themselves to be, ipso facto, doing good.
Efforts are underway to strengthen financial
accountability, but sustainable impact may
only be achieved if a more transparent
distinction is made between the different
tasks  of  c iv i l  soc iety  as  farmer
organisations/cooperatives providing services
for members, implementing partners for
investments in public goods (especially
infrastructure) and as bearers of civic
responsibility in the political sphere.
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Reframing the narratives amid
uncertainty
The Afghan rural development agenda centres
on how to proceed in the face of uncertainty
about the role of civil society, distrust of the
private sector and disagreement over the
role of the state. Afghans are ambivalent
about how to move forward. They are evenly
divided over whether it is better to channel
resources through the government, in order
to strengthen its legitimacy and capacity, or
whether continued dominance by NGOs and
the UN is preferred, given distrust of the
commitment of politicians and civil servants
to public welfare and stability.221 The aid
community has also demonstrated
considerable ambivalence. Its efforts to live
up to declarations about putting the
government in the driver’s seat have been
highly erratic. At the frontline of agricultural
development efforts, the aid community is
still in charge.
There is substantial justification for such
ambivalence by both the public and the aid
community. Afghanistan could, with some
degree of optimism, be described as a country
in transition from a state of chronic conflict
(due to war) to a state of chronic violence
and insecurity.222 It is undergoing a shift
from experiencing human rights abuses
directly related to war, to a context of
continued widespread abuses of rights related
to access to land, water and markets,
stemming from the power that has been
accumulated by individuals with guns. The
cessation of most open armed conflict has
therefore not necessarily led to changed
circumstances for most rural Afghans.
221 HRRAC, op cit.
222 Pain and Goodhand (2002) have suggested that Afghanistan may move in a similar direction as post-war Guatemala, which
experienced an increase in rural violence after the formal cessation of hostilities.
223 Based on Johnson, C. and Start, D. Rights, Claims and Capture: Understanding the Politics of Pro-Poor Policy. Overseas
Development Institute (ODI) Working Paper No. 145. London: ODI. 2001.
The degree to which rural people are able
to construct viable livelihoods within
prevailing structures will partly relate to how
well agricultural policies and programming
are anchored in realistic, principled and
pragmatic analyses of the situation at large.
In Afghanistan, as anywhere, policies to
ensure that rural development efforts
alleviate poverty or suffering are reliant on
three factors:
• Ability of agents (governmental, NGO or
private sector) to administer their
programmes effectively;
• Ability to ensure that targeted
beneficiaries are reached; and
• Ability to challenge societal vested
interests that seek to re-appropriate the
benefits that accrue to the intended
beneficiaries.223
Some progress is being made in the first two
areas. Questions remain about the choice
and effectiveness of strategies to address
the third. Many agencies possess a strong
body of tacit knowledge about what might
be a principled and pragmatic approach for
achieving these aims. What they too often
lack is a framework of intervention that
supports and insists upon applying this
knowledge in programme design and
implementation. The “triumph of the project”
too often overrules common sense.
Given the legacy of weak governance at all
levels, this is not just a short-term transitional
set of problems. Institutional ambivalence
and aid-dominated programming must be
seen as part and parcel of the relationships
and structures that will frame rural livelihood
strategies for the foreseeable future.  The
“weak state” question is not just an abstract
6. Conclusions and Recommendations
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issue of debate for political scientists. Conflict
and uncertainty are part of how a farmer
decides to plant or not to plant a given crop,
whether a land owner decides it is worth
investing in maintaining soil fertility, whether
a trader tries to enter into new and potentially
more profitable markets and whether
prospective returning migrants and refugees
see agriculture as something they want to
build their survival upon. These factors also
frame the decision-making of donors who
must choose whether or not it is worth
investing in highly flawed governmental
agricultural organisations, when the reform
agenda is far from anchored at central levels
and has yet to even be broached outside of
Kabul.
Principles and pragmatism
Despite all this, the extraordinary growth in
agricultural production over the past two
years indicates that something is going well
in rural Afghanistan. The scattered but
disturbing signs that this growth has resulted
in limited improvement in livelihoods among
the majority of rural people gives cause for
grave concern. We simply do not know much
about what is happening with
regard to the third condition
for transforming pro-poor
projects into pro-poor rural
development.  Fears  of
widespread and gross abuse of
power in local processes
related to farming suggest a
need to design and monitor
agricultural interventions in
relation to rights and protection
agendas. The question is how.
First, it is important to
acknowledge that we do not
know which factors enable poor
people in Afghanistan to
224 Solidarités. UNAMA Survey: Agriculture. Kabul: Solidarités. 2001, 10.
225 Alden Wily, op cit.
226 Conway, T., Moser, C., Norton, A. and Farrington, J. “Rights and Livelihoods Approaches: Exploring Policy Dimensions.”
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Natural Resource Perspectives 78. March 2002.
benefit from production growth and which
do not. There is no clear picture, at micro
level, of what might create an enabling
environment for the poor and landless to
thrive and what might encourage further
extortion and land grabbing. Some observers
fear that “rich valleys generate political
ambitions.”224 Others have found that rich
valleys have been able to bribe local
commanders, and thus avoid the ravages of
conflict.225 Participatory platforms may be
a way to resolve conflicts over resource
tenure. They may, on the other hand, merely
inflame existing tensions between pastoralists
and settled farmers and between landowners
and tenants as communities are pressured to
arrive at a consensus on development
priorities in order to access aid flows. A
rights-based approach may help us learn more
about who has power and how they are using
it, but it may not provide much guidance on
what should be done about it. A more lucid
definition of rights may be useful in clarifying
governmental responsibilities, but may say
little about how to mobilise the needed
human and financial capacity to live up to
those responsibilities.226 Furthermore, a
rights-based approach may be of little use in
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searching for a middle ground between the
grand assumptions about the roles and
responsibilities of the state that most of the
Afghan bureaucracy would like to pursue,
and the narrow NPM vision of the NDF.
The underlying paradox of rural development
efforts is that, on the one hand, the crisis
narrative of the aid community suggests that
development efforts can start from a blank
slate. On the other hand, the statist visions
of the government also encourage turning a
blind eye to ongoing local processes and
international market trends, since the visions
of the past are assumed to still be valid and
viable. Both remain rooted in a conviction
that development interventions can create
the missing social capital that will bind
together rural development processes. Neither
encourages looking at what is actually going
on in Afghan villages and the markets and
networks in which villages are entwined.
The challenge of getting local perspectives
onto the agenda will only be met on a
significant and sustainable scale if rural
people, especially farmers, organise
themselves and develop their own political
capacity for joint action. This requires both
institutional savvy and skills in financial
management. The emergence of some form
of farmer organisations would seem
imperative. The community development
efforts of most NGOs assume that they can
fill a supposed void through sitting with
shuras. The cooperative promotion efforts
of MAAH assume that Afghanistan can merely
pick up where it left off in the 1970s. Both
approaches directly aim at organising the
poor. Neither looks critically at the more
important issue of the local level incentives
that poor people have to organise and sustain
their organisations.227 Both approaches give
insufficient attention to how rural people —
farmers, labourers and traders — have been
getting on with their lives all along. Neither
227 See Joshi, A. and Moore, M. The mobilising potential of anti-poverty programmes. IDS Discussion Paper No. 374. Sussex:
Institute for Development Studies. 2000.
the interventions of the NGOs nor the
government are being mobilised with
adequate capacity in either political or
economic skills to catch up with the
rehabilitation agenda that rural people
themselves have been pursuing all these
years. Farmer voice and empowerment will
only start to emerge if programmes are based
on empirical understanding of the political,
economic and institutional underpinnings of
their ongoing livelihood strategies. The
collective experience of interventions in the
sector during the past few decades could
provide a basis for developing such an
understanding. The various efforts to establish
revolving funds and other processes based
on the introduction of subsidised agricultural
inputs could provide valuable information
regarding if and how these types of aid can
really contribute to the emergence of
sustainable and equitable institutions.
Analyses may also reveal whether
programming actually causes more damage
by reinforcing impressions that the aid
community and the state intend to continue
their provision of scattered and occasional
largesse. This requires a strong commitment
to learning, and a process of critical reflection
on the narratives upon which these types of
programmes rely.
There is also a need to acknowledge the
limited scope that governmental and aid-
financed services have in enhancing
agriculture’s impact on livelihoods. There is
a need to acknowledge the power of local
stakeholders to lead development where they
may. In some types of programming, such as
promotion of alternatives to opium production
and efforts to influence gender roles, a degree
of realism has taken hold. In others, the
unbridled optimism of international narratives
about “seamless transitions” between war
and development clearly still hold sway. The
following recommendations are intended as
a framework for more pragmatic and
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principled approaches to increasing the impact
of agricultural development efforts on Afghan
livelihoods. These suggestions acknowledge
the power that history and current social,
political and economic relations have in
steering local development processes and in
preserving national policy narratives. These
recommendations also propose how these
narratives must be confronted if development
planning is to proceed in a manner that is
cognisant of what can be done and what
should be done in the current circumstances.
The central conundrum regarding the “light”
NPM model and the older visions for a strong
state is that Afghanistan cannot afford either.
In financial terms, the country cannot afford
the level of investment that would be required
to create a strong public sector bureaucracy
and to intervene to protect and provide
services to promote the production of
commodities such as cotton in Kunduz to
compete with neighbouring countries. The
extremely weak tax base and the lack of
dynamism in the public sector mean that the
resources are simply not there to establish
a strong state in the foreseeable future.
At the same time, in socio-political terms,
the Afghan state cannot afford the de facto
laissez faire approach to rural development
that inevitably accompanies a light state. It
cannot afford to allow its potential
agricultural recovery to fade due to unfair
competition from imports. It cannot afford
to let the opium economy continue to
dominate commercial development. And it
cannot afford to forfeit state legitimacy by
failing to provide services and establish visible
structures that counterbalance the power of
the commanders in rural areas. Failure to
address these challenges is likely to lead to
the return of the centrifugal tendencies that
have torn the country apart so many times
in the past. Civil society and the private
sector could (and should) fill some of the
agricultural service provision breach, but
their capacity and willingness to shoulder a
greater burden is contingent on the stability
that can only be achieved through a stronger
state in rural areas.
The solution for this conundrum is of course
generally assumed to be aid. The international
community is expected to ensure that these
gaps can be filled, while waiting for the
government’s own financial and human
resources to get up to speed. But will a
consistency of funding and political
commitment be maintained over the next
few crucial years? This paper echoes the
critique of unfulfilled promises and
inconsistent rhetoric from the donor
community about what the Afghan state will
and won’t be helped to do. Still, it may be
pragmatically more appropriate to design
approaches that are cognisant of the
fickleness that the aid community has
repeatedly shown in financing post-conflict
rehabilitation and reconstruction throughout
the world, and the short memory that has
been demonstrated time after time in
Afghanistan in particular. There is a need for
advocacy and also for a degree of jaded
realism. The following recommendations are
presented in such a spirit.
Recommendations
Learn about and build consensus on the
goals and the meaning of a facilitating
and regulating state in agricultural
development
Current policy formation efforts combine
(and conflate) the needs for establishing
efficiency through NPM approaches with
enhancing equity in order to reverse the
trends that have driven the conflict over the
past decades. International experience has
shown that efficiency and equity can be
combined, but are not self-evident
bedfellows. There is a need to move toward
more evidence-based policies that combine
principled commitments to efficiency and
equity with pragmatic acknowledgement of
trade-offs due to on-the-ground realities and
the essential but limited impact that aid can
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make on social, political and economic
relations.
• Better coordination is both a prerequisite
and a product of intra-agency learning.
Sharing of knowledge is the most
appropriate basis for ensuring greater
agreement regarding what outside support
farmers need and who the most
appropriate actor is to provide this
support.
• Improved programming relies on frank
analyses of (a) the ability of different
service providers to reach different target
groups, (b) the cost efficiency and
effectiveness of different methods, and
(c) the potential sustainability of different
institutional service structures.
• These analyses will probably point toward
the need for a two-pronged approach to
rural development (research and
extension in particular), with growth and
privatisation leading efforts in high
potential and accessible areas, such as
Kunduz Province, and a concern for basic
food security and social protection in
weakly integrated areas, for example,
Hazarajat.
• There is a need to concretise the
objectives of the National Development
Framework by more specifically defining
what support farmers should expect to
receive, and by prioritising the use of
public/aid resources to ensure that the
goals of promoting both growth and equity
are addressed in a more transparent
manner.
• Given the extreme levels of rural
destitution and vulnerability, this
consensus can provide a basis for seeing
how enhanced social protection
programming can ensure both basic
survival and the provision of resource
flows that rural people can invest in
production.
Reassess and reinforce the accountability
of the private sector and civil society in
agricultural development
In order to better define the role of the state,
notions and normative aims regarding the
private sector and civil society must be
anchored in an understanding of what these
sets of institutions really are. It is not enough
to label the private sector or civil society as
the solution. A frank assessment is needed
of what agricultural services they provide
and why they are providing (or failing to
provide) services to different groups of
farmers. Disaggregation between high and
low potential areas and between wealthy
and poor producers is a prerequisite to
predicting where different strategies can be
expected to succeed and who is likely to
benefit.
• There is a need for clear and independent
evaluation of current efforts to delegate
responsibilities to shuras, cooperatives
and other civil society institutions, and
to assess the impact of efforts to
transform these institutions into
egalitarian and/or commercially oriented
organisations.
• Investments in building civil society’s
capacities for channelling aid resources
to agricultural development need to be
coupled with more specific attention to
if and how these institutions can be made
more accountable to their communities.
• Civil society should be supported to
strengthen the capacity of farmers to
make demands, instead of just training
shuras to manage the receipt of aid
resources. This objective has been
addressed in some sectors, but is still
weak in agriculture.
• Initial efforts to encourage the private
sector to provide agricultural services are
encouraging, but are still dwarfed by the
continued tendency of aid agencies to
undercut the market for private service
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providers, or are distorted by tendencies
to favour a few chosen entrepreneurs
with massive subsidies. This needs to be
addressed through tighter coordination,
in particular through good donorship.
• The greatest concern of farmers is the
need to ensure that private input suppliers
are held accountable for the services that
they provide, including those selling
fertilisers and pesticides and those
providing veterinary medicines and
vaccines. Priority should be given to
enhancing the capacity of the state to
carry out its regulatory responsibilities.
Investment in this area would illustrate
that public sector reform is not just an
agenda to dismantle the state, but
actually results in visible improvements
in service provision.
• Critical consideration must be given to
the need to apply “protection” concepts
to assessing the likely intra- and inter-
community impact of agricultural
interventions, particularly irrigation. This
should be done based on an understanding
of how Afghan farmers, community
leaders and commanders have dealt with
conflict and tried to manipulate the
outcomes to benefit their own livelihood
strategies.
Put the market on the agenda
Apart from woes about the supposedly
unassailable profitability of opium production,
empirically grounded agro-economic and
market thinking has not gained centre stage
in policies and programming. Even those who
have recognised the importance of
diversification and market orientation have
run into difficulties in identifying where and
how to intervene. The challenges to gaining
an overview of market forces in a country
where such a large proportion of the market
is illicit are admittedly enormous, but the
dangers of continuing to leave these factors
on the back burner are greater. The market
is not a panacea for equitable rural
development, but recognition of its
importance would be an important step in
realigning programming with the prevailing
livelihood strategies of rural people and the
economic realities they face when trying to
sell their crops.
• Efforts to promote export agriculture
must be more cognisant of regional and
international markets if they are to avoid
leading farmers into unprofitable and
unsustainable endeavours.
• Special attention should be paid to using
capacity building to introduce alternative
perspectives on what is possible and
desirable in commercial development, as
would guidelines to promote a do-no-
harm-to-the-market frame of analysis in
agricultural service provision.
• If market development initiatives are to
be pro-poor, then priorities for aid
investments must take into account the
ways in which new market prospects may
best stimulate the creation of off-farm,
non-farm and large-farm employment
opportunities.
• After recent successes in increasing
production, attention should shift to the
links between farm production and market
demand. The most important of these
factors is storage and processing.
Deal with risk
In light of the legacy of conflict and natural
disasters, Afghans will inevitably make their
decisions about how to integrate agriculture
into their livelihoods primarily based on an
assessment of risk. Fears of renewed conflict
and natural hazards are at the core of
traders’, farmers’ and rural labourers’ choice
of livelihood options. The actions of the state
and the aid community already directly affect
the parameters for these risk assessments.
The relevance and effectiveness of agriculture
programming would therefore increase
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enormously if risk was given far greater
prominence in policy formation. Instead of
being seen as a factor that scares donors,
risk awareness should be used to highlight
priorities for protecting rural livelihoods.
• While it is important not to exaggerate
the effectiveness of traditional or informal
r isk reduction inst itut ions and
mechanisms, planning should nonetheless
recognise that they are the first line of
defence in dealing with natural hazards
and conflict, and that formal institutions
for risk management (insurance, civil
protection, governmental land use
planning structures, etc.) will not emerge
in the near future.
• Traditional mechanisms cannot, however,
provide much protection against market
uncertainty. In order to mitigate these
risks, it is important to increase awareness
among aid agency and government staff
of regional and international market
trends.
• A priority for helping farmers manage risk
should be providing information on
markets and weather. Market information
services and meteorological information,
including snow surveys, would help
farmers predict what might be a profitable
crop and how much irrigation water may
be available.
• Diversification within and beyond
traditional livelihoods through migration,
commercialisation and other strategies
has long been the most effective set of
risk reduction strategies employed by
rural Afghans. Aid may have little direct
role to play in enhancing these strategies,
but livelihood-focused programming must
be anchored in an awareness of their
importance.
• Efforts to combat the opium economy are
centred on increasing the risks for poppy
production relative to other livelihood
options. This specific aspect of risk
enhancement  deserves  greater
prominence.
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